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Abstract 
 
The question of gender and gender representation has been an issue for STEM 
fields like computer science and software engineering for decades. This dissertation 
argues that the impact of labor practices in such fields promotes gender disparity by 
masking gender, and often sexuality, behind myths of mastery and correctness. In this 
dissertation, I approach technical objects like computer code and protocol specifications 
from the BitTorrent and Bitcoin software packages, and argue that gendered forms of 
labor that have existed since the inception of computer programming as a profession are 
evident in technical documents like code. Furthermore, I argue that this labor is a 
communicative labor steeped in political rhetoric and cultural practices. As such, moving 
past a relative examination of code or software as a text, or as a procedure, invites a 
performative investigation of code. Drawing from theories in feminist technology and 
queer computational studies, I argue that gender, activism, and power relations are 
implicit in these technical objects, and that a rhetoric of gender and computation can 
emerge as a critical and practical practice in fields such as software engineering and 
technical communication. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
Digital Technology is not gender neutral. In terms of communicative technology, there is 
a sense in which scholars understand this intuitively. And yet we all, at some time, 
bracket the potential implications of gendered media in terms of functionality and 
correctness. This could be for a number of reasons, but first and foremost I posit that the 
seeming break between what serves as cultural technology and what serves as functional 
technology rests in how we ask questions regarding the more esoteric aspects of digital 
media. Code studies, an emerging body of scholarship in media studies, rhetorical 
studies, and feminist studies has emerged as a response to the notion of computer 
programming languages as a cultural form of expression. This seems perfectly reasonable 
in that code is, in many senses, a language. But it is precisely when we take in the 
implications of something like computer source code, and the understanding that code 
constructs an audience in a way that necessarily includes both humans and machines 
(Hayles 2010), which in turn limits the application of code as language. And yet, as 
scholars such as Annette Vee, James Brown Jr., and queer digital artist Zach Blas have 
argued, code is, and always is, a communicative function of cultural labor. 
Following that understanding of a technological object like code, I put forth the 
central question of my argument: what is the communicative function of code? In 
exploring something like code, we typically understand it as we would understand a text, 
which means taking pieces of it and literally reading algorithms as pieces of meaning-
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making. And yet code, like writing more broadly, is constituted not simply by the 
intention of an author creating software, but by an 
      immense body of labor, knowledge, and technology that frames any capacity for 
meaningful interaction. Even the simplest line of code has a host of attendant software 
and code libraries that make it meaningful both technologically and culturally, rooted in 
decades of research into mathematics, engineering, and philosophy. A given selection of 
code itself might be only a small portion of a larger program, a logic that spans millions 
of lines of code written by dozens of individuals. And, most importantly for my argument 
here, all that labor and all that writing of code is embedded in cultural understandings of 
what it means to work collaboratively and collectively through new techniques of 
development in a new medium. And these cultural assumptions have largely gathered in a 
constellation of notably masculine characteristics. The rise of the “brogrammer” culture 
in Silicon Valley, of women in bikinis as videogame conferences, all serve as a backdrop 
for a larger question of how masculinity is repurposed and defined within a technological 
context. And, further, as calls continue for an increased awareness and action regarding 
the representation of women in technical fields, how do scholars consider the 
operationalized nature of these masculine characteristics in the technology and 
professional practices they use every day? 
The history of computer programming (which I will cover very briefly in chapter 
2) has been shown by scholars as one structured on the “clerical” work of women. As 
men stepped into the role of “the programmer” with the advent of software as we know it, 
then a shift also occurred in how we understand technology as not only an object of use, 
but as a practice and, ultimately, as a cultural paradigm. What was once seen as an 
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ultimately clerical occupation became scientific and challenging, which led to the 
institutionalization of a gender disparity that recognized men as users of technology, and 
women simply as (and later, replaced by) technology. Wendy Chun (2004) writes that it 
is not simply the culture of technology that repels women from technological fields, but it 
is the implicit culture of masculinity within the technology itself that structures the very 
condition of work within those fields. That is, the history of computing is not a theater of 
gender representation on top of a neutral technological substrate, but rather a relationship 
between practices in technology and how they emerge from gendered history. 
This is where I situate my argument. If a category like gender is such that it 
permeates even seemingly esoteric technology like computer code execution or 
networked communication technologies, where is the space in which a field like rhetoric 
investigates this phenomenon? I argue that initial inquiry must incorporate studies in 
technology alongside insight from scholars working with gender and technology in such a 
way as to recognize how the text of something like computer code (or other logical 
protocols, as I will discuss in chapters 3 and 4) actually functions computationally and 
culturally. I argue here that a significant point of entry will tie into programming 
techniques and practices that permeate small and large-scale software, which in turn links 
software development to a question of communication and agency. 
 
Agency and Rhetoric 
As a multi-issue debate over rhetorical agency and pedagogy unfolded over the pages of 
the Rhetoric Society Quarterly during 2004 and 2005, I became aware of how these terms 
structure rhetoric’s fashioning of an ethical or civic imperative built around both 
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rhetoric’s humanist tradition and its poststructural or posthuman trajectories. Humanist 
scholars such as Michael Leff and Cheryl Geisler take posthuman critique of subjectivity 
and agency within a frame of complex social and historical mediation that complicates 
agency, while situating rhetoric as realm of intentional language use, and deliberative 
political or civic action. Others such as Jenny Rice, Byron Hawk, and Colin Brooke 
attempt to discuss agency as a networked effect, of situatedness and the interplay of 
actors producing rhetoric effects in circulatory channels of meaning-making. In many 
cases, one can be adopted by the other, or assumptions of one assimilated within the 
framework of the other: Michael Leff (2012) adopts a more nuanced concept of agency 
via social and historical mediation that problematizes the singular author or rhetor while 
asserting the civic values from which that model arises. Similarly, Karen Lunsford (2004) 
argues that humanist rhetoric can take into account the critiques of posthumanism, but it 
must not give up its ethical and civic imperatives that stems from a humanist account of 
agency and subjectivity, arguing that some posthuman scholars see rhetorical study as a 
study of the “content” of rhetorical effect, as opposed to a Humanist tradition of 
civic/pedagogical instruction through a teachable techne of rhetoric that plays out in 
deliberative, normative political frameworks (such as “democracy”). However, what has 
become apparent to me and others is that the introduction of networked, digital 
technologies as a fundamental reality of communication brings into relief how these 
seemingly opposed concepts (posthuman critique and humanist techne) converge. 
In “How Ought We to Understand the Concept of Rhetorical Agency? Report 
from the ARS,” Cheryl Geisler (2004) summarizes and responds to the driving topic of 
the titular ARS meeting on the question of rhetorical agency and the “future” of the 
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discipline of rhetoric. Geisler writes that the question foreshadows “the complex interplay 
between rhetoric’s interpretive project and rhetoric’s educational mission” (9). In an 
accompanying piece in the same issue, Leff and Lunsford write in "Afterword: A 
Dialogue" that rhetoric's "birthright" is a focus on civic education rooted in rhetorical 
training. Lunsford, as one half of the titular dialogists, remarks that she believes 
rhetoric’s role in the university is “developing competent and ethical citizens” through 
rhetorical instructions, although some other theorists might view rhetoric as a “content” 
discipline focused on history and theory (Leff and Lunsford 7). Both Leff and Lunsford 
argue that rhetoric's claim to a pedagogical imperative is at odds with its imbrication with 
the "German model of the university" and thus a turn towards theory, research, and 
criticism (7). Geisler, for her part, acknowledges the moves to rethink agency but argues 
both that agency is a possession, and that keeping rhetorical theory within its classical, 
humanist tradition keeps rhetoric tied to a pedagogical mission grounded in political 
identity and change (Geisler 15). Both essays trace a similar map of the field, in that they 
argue that the lynchpin of both a rhetorician's agency and the agency of the field of 
rhetoric as a whole is tied to a theory of action and effect tied to an intentional agent (Leff 
and Lunsford 15). This suggests that the loss of a concept of agency (as they ascribe to a 
poststructural, postmodern, and/or posthumanist position) itself leaves rhetoric with little 
to do, precisely because the mission of rhetoric “as a productive art” (that it teach and 
describe efficacious action in the world, and that this art is teachable) no longer has a 
content or meaning within disciplinary or institutional contexts (and this she ascribes 
primarily to the split between an analytic rhetorical approach and its productive 
counterpart). Rhetoricians will have nothing to say about the “potential and obligations” 
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of students in rhetorical classrooms, and while functioning as critics rhetoricians will 
have no purchase from which to describe, articulate, or empower rhetorical agent (16). 
Rhetoric as a political and pedagogical concept loses its ability to be either beyond the 
critiques of poststructural or posthumanist thought. 
In their response essay “‘Ouija Board, Are There Any Communications?’ Agency, 
Ontotheology, and the Death of the Humanist Subject, or, Continuing the ARS 
Conversation,” Christian Lundberg and Joshua Gunn (2005) write, 
 
[a]lthough [Geisler] rightfully notes that the discussion question of 
rhetorical agency often melds the ontological (what?) with the ethical 
(how?), she and others nevertheless seek to infer the former by presenting 
the latter evangelically, stressing the need of moral activism for civic 
salvation and charging those with postructural and/or posthumanist 
sympathies as advocating a nihilistic brand of Calvinist passivity. (86) 
 
The delineation of the subject or agent a priori to a discussion of political action implies, 
at its heart, an a priori field of political action, dissent, and, as a result, rhetoric grounded 
within that agent position. Leff and Lunsford share concern with Geisler that the loss of 
the “autonomous human agent” for rhetoric signifies a loss of rhetorical possibility and 
the capacity to act politically. Lundsford in particular writes that the field, in negotiating 
a way in which to recognize the contingency of rhetorical action without falling into the 
trap of the death of the enlightenment subject, can retain both rhetoric’s commitment to 
human autonomy and political action (Leff and Lunsford 65). Leff, Lunsford, and Geisler 
all connect to the understanding that rhetoric, as an intentional techne deployed for 
political change and as an art that is teachable, requires some fashioning (however 
problematized) of the human subject/agent within discursive action before or 
7 
 
concurrently with a field of possibility, and this field is constituted as a 
civically/deliberatively engaged humanist subject. Geisler writes in her argument for 
agents and agency is twofold: an argument from fact (“facts on the ground do not appear 
to support the proposition that rhetorical agency is illusionary”) and from value: 
If neither our students nor our fellow citizens have such potential 
[rhetorical and civic] obligations . . . we may sidestep these questions of 
potential and obligations . . . but only at the cost of the irrelevancy of 
rhetoric. (Geisler 16) 
 
In all cases, Geisler, Lunsford, and Leff are engaged with rhetoric’s mission as one of 
educating, civically and ethically, future citizens and civic subjects in a public world, and 
agency as observed must be a description of such a position. 
From these comments, I highlight four claims specifying where the rub between 
critical/ theoretical rhetoric and the pedagogical imperative of rhetoric lies. I also respond 
to these claims in order to build from them and fashion a jumping-off point for further 
discussion: 
(1) The framing of rhetoric as that which must function as an education for some 
arguably productive, ethical citizen subject asserts and a priori subject position which, in 
its definition, is deemed as ontologically necessary for agency (or the possession of 
agency) and thus defines itself circularly. For example, Geisler’s assertion that rhetorical 
agency exists, because “subaltern groups . . . are not without agency altogether” (through 
discourse, performance, etc.), situates agency as a “something” already always figured 
within civically-oriented power relations rather than reading the 
poststructural/posthumanist critique of the agent as a critique of that very same 
normative, boundary-drawing move, of defining a frame of democratic and deliberative 
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discourse (or the struggles for such discursive opportunities) beforehand (15). This can 
also be seen in Lunsford's mobilization of feminist critiques of poststructural thought, 
which undermine the notion of a postructural, productive agent position by arguing that 
theory, divorced from productive concerns of rhetorical agency, supplants the very 
subjectivity and agency women have fought for for years. Lundberg and Gunn argue, 
however, that “it does not necessarily follow that agency must be rooted in an 
autonomous, intending human agent . . . Nor does the mere fact of movement allow for 
the discernment of the movement’s cause without pre-reading the situation through the 
lens of a humanist account of an agent producing agency” (Lundberg and Gunn 92). 
Lundberg and Gunn point out, rightfully so, that the definition of the agent is a definition 
of horizons of potential actions, possible positions, and largely of the possibilities of 
rhetoric as a whole. More specifically, Lundberg and Gunn's critique of Geisler is that her 
reading of poststructural and posthumanist thought is not very generous: the critique itself 
is to ward off the dangers of deciding beforehand the conditions of agency across rhetoric 
as a practice. In this way, we can see the different opinions between those who see a split 
between the critical and productive aspects of rhetoric, and those who see the critical as 
responding to and problematizing, in this case, the productive. 
(2) The assertion of a politics a priori from which rhetorical action finds its 
meaning. Ronald Walter Greene (2004), in many ways, addresses this concern in his 
essay “Rhetoric and Capitalism: Rhetorical Agency as Communicative Labor.” Greene’s 
critique is that it is a “commonplace to describe rhetorical agency as political action,” and 
by default that political action will fall within civically-minded modes of persuasion and 
discourse (188). He writes that “rhetorical agency often takes on the characteristics of a 
9 
 
normative theory of citizenship” in which the “good citizen persuades and is persuaded 
by the gentle force of the better argument” (188). This is a rhetorical structure of orator-
statesman that pre-supposes publics, campaigns, elections, speeches, and debates. 
Strategies and effectiveness are polarized within these concepts so that effectiveness 
becomes politically and ethically compromised as to prioritize discourse within these 
particular formations. Rhetorical agency, formulated with ostensibly republican-
democratic modes of deliberative discourse, and rhetorical agency qua political change 
becomes a priori a mode of engagement within rational (“gentle”) discursive 
engagement. 
Greene notes that the recognition of the public political sphere, as a form of 
marketing and capital engagement that exists strictly within the logics of this political 
rhetoric, makes manifests a rhetoric of money, advertising, and spectacular messages 
with “effectiveness” modeled on one’s ability to participate within these particular 
discourses. Therefore, while there are various strategies through which to think about 
how rhetoric functions persuasively in this civic context, these strategies do not address 
how rhetorical agency--as the ability to effect change within an ultimately ethically 
corrupt system--functions without being defined by said structures. This encourages 
rhetorical scholars to become “moral entrepreneurs scolding, correcting, and encouraging 
the body politic to improve the quality and quantity of political participation” (189). That 
is, rhetoric as a civic endeavor within a model of political communication stands either in 
support of, or in opposition to, normative power, and the pedagogical drive of rhetoric to 
teach “effective” rhetoric not only must acknowledge these structures, but in some ways, 
acquiesce to them (198). Thinking about the practices, rather than the content, of 
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rhetorical engagement in this context means that the discursive structures of engagement 
(debate, protest, public gatherings, letter writing, etc.) are at once the primary means of 
exercising rhetorical agency and at the same time the means adjudicated by a system not 
directly indebted to the recognition of novel rhetorical agency. Rhetoric is always 
suspended within a dialectic of structure and resistance. 
Outside of Greene’s focus on labor and communication, Erin Rand (2014), in 
Reclaiming Queer, writes that theorizing agency as oppositional always already limits the 
potential for that agency, that the true indeterminacy of agency only comes when we 
move from this dialectic. Drawing from Karolyn Kohr Campbell’s (2005) “Agency, 
Promiscuous and Protean,” Rand takes as a starting point Campbell’s argument that 
agencies are “points of articulation” and that agency is “textual,” arguing that agency 
only works through persuasive acts (texts, in Rand’s case) that are recognizable or 
intelligible within particular contexts (7). While a democratic-republican context would 
recognize a particular set of practices as legitimate, getting caught within the dialectic 
would limit and over-determine the possibility of agencies to emerge. Rather, Rand posits 
a “queer” agency that represents the excess of rhetorical action, the inventiveness and 
potential for action to work. “Queer” agency, in her theories, does not presuppose 
oppositional qualities as this inscribes agential possibility within the conditions of 
opposition (that is, it is always already oppositional, which is to say, circumscribed 
within the logics of the oppositional discourse) (Rand 23). Rather, it posits that there are 
two crucial gaps within theorizations of queer agency: first, that the agent (in this case, a 
“queer” agent) does not contain the capacity to determine the effectiveness of its actions 
(just being a queer agent does not mean that one acts queerly); and next, that the 
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effectiveness of and action cannot be determined by that action, only by the “uptake of its 
effects (24). This requires, in many ways, indeterminate ideas of the agent. 
(3) That communication is transparent and transcendent (Lundberg and Gunn 84). 
A small point, but with huge ramifications: that persuasion, discourse, rhetoric, exist 
unfettered or, if mediated, mediated as a contained unity or whole (my discourse is 
mutated through mediation precisely because there is a discrete "production/produced" 
relationship at the core of all of these points, the techne of rhetoric). This suggests a 
wholeness to communication, a separateness of discourse and its transmission or 
propagation. A small sentence within Lundberg and Gunn’s critique links the figure of 
the Ouija board to a theory of communication as a connection, a conduit between two 
subjects through which a sharing of discourse occurs. Implicitly, like a game of 
Telephone, this implies that there is “a” communication happening in which success, 
failure, or even persuasive effects resides within the communication itself. In “Refitting 
Fantasy,” Gunn writes that our notions of communication being something that connects 
transcendent subjects are based on “fantasy,” the fantasy itself a mechanism of mediation 
that allows communicators to engage with behaviors and effects. That is, communication 
is never a direct link but an engagement with effects in the world (a “cold read,” as Gunn 
uses the metaphor of a psychic reading). Both Gunn and Lundberg pick this back up in 
“Ouija Board” to point out how embedded a rhetorical construct of agency is within a 
“ontotheological framework” of agency, in that however problematized, it implies and 
harkens to the dissolution of the Cartesian self, the intentional subject that must exist, that 
necessitates a particular set of possibilities (84). 
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Lundberg and Gunn’s problematization of the agent stems from this anxiety: for 
Gunn, the anxiety over agency is a mediation of how we think about the possibilities of 
agential action, that “[i]nsofar as fantasies offer, simultaneously, a frame within which to 
exercise agency . . . our contemporary anxiety about the rhetorical agent is a generative or 
productive scholarly neurosis” (Gunn 2004, 19).. The mediating effect of fantasy at once 
gives us legs from which to articulate forms of action. That is, the “gaps” upon which 
Rand bases her theory of agencies can be seen as gaps of mediation, in which the novelty 
of agency arises from an understanding that there is no actual connection, but a response 
to and uptake of rhetorical practices. 
Mediation being a key term here, I think, works precisely because we have no 
direct link to the reality of agency, simply the effects of acts from which we can deduce 
particular kinds of agency (and not agents). Thus the media through which effects are 
consumed construct the ways in which we think about agential potentiality. As Friedrich 
Kittler (2009) writes, “a medium is a medium is a medium. Therefore, it cannot be 
translated” (265). The “cold reading” of effects do not come from the extraction of 
content from the observation of these effects. If we follow Lundberg and Gunn, the co-
construction of the possibility of rhetorical agency comes through mediated engagements 
with agencies that are only interpreted through effects. But as the mediation of these 
effects produces the necessary framing for exercise of any agency, we should also 
recognize that the movement of “meaning” through mediating agencies is not simply a 
form of translating those meaningful performances through those agencies (the 
transcendence of communication). Rather, the movement of one medium to another, of 
articulating the function of something within the logic of another, requires that we let go 
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of the universal translatability of meaning as a metric for studying effect, success/failure, 
or persuasive capacity. Mapping Kittler’s distinction between translation (“the exclusion 
of all particularities in favor of a general equivalent”) and transposition (the serial 
movement of the logic and relations of a medium into another) locates intelligibility not 
simply within a general realm of signification, but also within a material and logical 
realm of mediating concepts and/or technologies. Thus communication, seen as moving 
through the “channel” of language, breaks down when it is a function through and of 
mediation (266).   
(4)    That rhetoric as a productive art must call upon a subjective capacity for 
agency that allows for its teaching, training, and/or transference. That is, rhetoric has as 
its core a pedagogical project that maintains its legitimacy as a discipline, and it is tied to 
the assumptions of the first three claims above. This teachability, in fact, suggests its own 
opposite (the “non-artistic” critical approach to rhetorical studies) and the ways in which 
this opposite only comes about through a loss of the civil, pedagogical project of rhetoric 
(and the loss of rhetoric’s “birthright”). 
 
Rhetoric and the Digital 
From the above, I hope to construct a counterpoint to the prevailing assumptions about 
subjectivity and agency, viewing this opposition through of a contingent politics that 
favors an indeterminate relationship between agencies, actions, and effects emerging 
from mediating technologies. But I further ask if there is a platform here in which my 
counterpoint engages with the possibility of civic rhetoric, or if nothing else a rhetorical 
pedagogy of media not committed to the humanist project. I illustrate some connecting 
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work within the realm of digital rhetoric (an area of study in itself concerned with 
rhetoric and its uptake through mediating digital technologies). And while digital rhetoric 
as a field is immense and only growing larger, a few examples can illustrate a movement 
I want to follow. James Zappen (2005), in his essay “Digital Rhetoric: Towards an 
Integrated Theory,” articulates a few approaches to digital rhetoric that have emerged in 
the field. Zappen breaks downs these approaches within a few categories that show how 
rhetoric works in or through digital technology. First, he points towards the ways in 
which “traditional rhetorical strategies” are reconfigured or function in digital spaces 
(319). The authors that Zappen cites here draw from traditional Greek rhetoric, and 
situate rhetoric as a method of communication rather than just persuasion. Zappen also 
discusses how technology constrains and enables the enactment and transformation of 
rhetoric in digital spaces, and how identities and communities are formed symbolically in 
these spaces (321-322). Zappen’s takeaway here is that technology mediates rhetoric, but 
that rhetoric itself is something that exists outside of technology to some extent, 
something that travels through or is transformed by technology. While Zappen is more 
than open to how rhetoric is transformed through technology, the extrapolation of 
rhetoric as a theoretical reality outside of technology draws Zappen to think of rhetoric in 
terms of discrete discursive objects that travel through technology rather than something 
emergent from it. This theorization of rhetoric leads to the fashioning of rhetorical theory 
(rather new theory or “transformed” theory) in terms of “spaces,” “communities,” and 
“identities.” While still commensurate with the idea of rhetoric as political, as expressive, 
his move towards an integrated theory fashions existing rhetorical notions of subjects and 
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agency into new digital modes of communication. Thus we get terms such as “spaces,” 
“communities,” and “identities” as defining paradigms for communication online. 
Other scholars attempt to move away from some of this language, seeking out 
new ways to think about how rhetoric is studied in produced through digital media. 
Collin Brooke (2009), in Lingua Fracta, discusses the five classical canons of rhetoric 
and re-articulates them within the framework of a digital, networked culture. These 
canon, once seen as the origin of rhetorical education and preparation, are an attempt to 
think about the generation and circulation of rhetoric through digital media (211). 
Brooke’s method is similar to Byron Hawk’s (2004), who in “Toward a Rhetoric of 
Network (Media) Culture: Notes on Polarities and Potentialities” shifts traditional 
rhetorical concepts such as Aristotelian ethos, pathos, and logos into the language of 
digital communication technology in order to discuss the new ways in which rhetoric 
functions in network culture. James Porter (2009) situates rhetoric and delivery (another 
canon) within digital technology through a discussion of embodiment, circulation, and 
access. 
This configuration of rhetorical theory within the digital acknowledges, to some 
extent, that “transformations” of rhetoric but does not entertain the question of how the 
underpinning assumptions of rhetoric might be fundamentally different. In looking 
through “spaces” and “identities,” there is a work of seeing rhetorical assumptions of 
audience and rhetors as discrete categories that situate rhetoric as a communicative act 
through traditionally-know discourse. As an interesting move away from this, however, 
we might look as Elizabeth Losh (2010). and her definition of “digital” rhetoric. In her 
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book Virtualpolitik, Losh discusses four definitions of digital rhetoric that she relates 
through their definitions themselves: 
 
1. The conventions of new digital genres in everyday discourse, 
 
2. Public, political discourse disseminated through digital technology, 
 
3. An academic discipline that studies rhetoric in digital technology, and 
 
4. The discipline of information science and its discussion of information 
integrity, 
 
decision-making, and uncertainty (47-48). 
 
In working through these definitions, Losh responds to Zappen’s final argument that 
digital rhetoric is a theory built around a particular set of discrete rhetorical objects, by 
saying that a general theory of digital rhetoric could be developed, if rhetoricians are 
willing to recognize the movement through these various definitions. In particular, the 
definition (4), which draws from information science and cybernetics to discuss the 
Shannon-Weaver model of communication (which works through questions of signals, 
noise, and information integrity), offers ways in which to refine research questions that 
stem through the first three definitions. That is, para-disciplinary conversations that move 
through the sciences, the humanities, and many other areas of knowledge will determine 
how we think of rhetoric in digital technology, not simply how we think of rhetoric itself, 
alone, within its own disciplinary confines (98). And while Losh is still articulating a 
digital rhetoric that thinks back to classical determinations of communication and 
persuasion, her last definition opens up an interesting avenue for inquiry. I look at this as 
an invitation to think about the media of communication in rhetorical studies not as the 
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carrier or transmitter of communications, but to also think about how technology function 
rhetorically (that is, to look at how rhetoric is manifest from questions tied to the 
technicity of its deployment). 
Losh’s definition, I suggest, leads us to a question of medium. Media theorist 
Jussi Parikka writes that anything can itself be a medium: a medium of transmission is 
not a priori decided as inert technology that stands in between two intentional 
communicators. Media is often coded, biological, effectual methods of co-constructing 
worlds through communicative means. Subjectivities and agencies is this not entirely 
contingent (they emerge through a play of media protocols) , and a rethinking of the 
production of agencies, begs that we understand agency as not necessarily hegemonic or 
resistive, or necessarily arising from a point of articulation, but as a product of media 
logics. In “Protocol, Control, and Networks,” Galloway and Eugene Thacker (2004) 
argue that the strength of protocol and networks is that “the problem-solving process is 
not dependent on any one problem-solving ‘agent’ but that the solution . . . arises from 
the context of distributed regulation” (18). More apropos to rhetoric, a protocol is written 
as a text, certainly, and there is an audience who will read such technical documentation 
and enact it, respond to it, and so one. But the product of a protocol, the formations of 
mediated communications that continually iterate over and through one another, do not fit 
within the rhetorical construct of text, audience, author. It would be a mistake to further 
call the users of the Internet an “audience” even as they are continually moved or 
articulated through the effects of the various protocols that comprise its formation. 
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Gender, Queer Computation and Collaborative Labor 
The links I seek to create here are those between the user and the creator of software as 
co-constituents in a cultural practice that also involves an active and culturally significant 
technology. If the anxiety over rhetorical agency is embedded within a loss of potential 
political or pedagogical importance, then a posthuman account of technology allows for 
such purchase. However, it is also quite easy to allow posthuman rhetorical studies of 
media to alternatively bracket cultural categories of gender, race, or class behind a more 
broad and abstract notion of network or computational culture. Technology becomes a 
master discourse. Once it is broken from a technological determinacy and grounded in a 
space of open theorization, it does not necessarily lose the luster of its novelty or 
uniqueness. But technology as a horizon of new social interaction often belies the labor-
intensive realities of the creation of technology, and often does so by focusing heavily on 
either technology’s capacity for representation (either in media or in its creation) or in its 
capacity for abstracting its cultural roots. 
Following this, I want to introduce a rhetorical approach to networks and 
technology that attends to the gendered underpinnings of the history of digital media. 
Chapter 2, then, initially constructs a foundation for a rhetoric of networks as rhetorically 
meaningful structures through a theory of queer protocol. Through an intersection of 
queer and gender theory (specifically focusing on Judith Butler and performativity and 
Halberstam’s notion of queer failure) and critical code studies, I will discuss Zach Blas’s 
"transCoder" programming SDK and Julie Levin Russo’s Slash Goggles to illustrate the 
connections between computer code and the performance of subversive 
"disidentifications" through digital technology. Jussi Parikka (2010) writes that media are 
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constituted by “forces imperceptible to human understanding but glimpsed through their 
effects only—the logic of algorithms, calculations, and voltages unreachable in itself, yet 
continuously mediated and affecting the bodies of humans,” and as such the work of 
forming subjectivities and agencies must work through multiple registers of 
communication outside those prescribed by humanist models of discourse (199). The 
primary question here is how practices intrinsic to computer programming—specifically 
the technique of “abstraction”—simultaneously represent an efficient and effective 
approach to software development, and also a historically gendered form of digital labor. 
I discuss abstraction as a performative discourse in that it creates the interface mechanism 
between previous and immense histories of labor and the potential for new technological 
development. The significance of this is that the historical relationship of technology and 
gender is not simply constructed in a culture external to the technology, but is embedded 
in the technology itself. Blas and Russo not only demonstrate potential disidentifications 
to code as a totalizing discourse, but offer a way for scholars to discuss methods for 
engaging both the cultural and technological aspects of that discourse. 
Chapter 3 works through a study the BitTorrent protocol. and how this functions 
as a way to think about agencies outside their grounding in determined subjectivities. 
BitTorrent offers a new way to share files that refashions older client/server models of 
peer sharing by exploding the model across a paradigm of swarms. The “swarm” is 
therefore an abstraction of underlying Internet protocols like TCP/IP that builds from the 
technology to accomplish a task more efficiently. Devised in response to the closure of 
various file sharing services, and the prosecution of thousands of individuals within these 
networks, I illustrate the overlapping concerns of copyright interests and how Bittorrent 
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embodies a refiguring of these concerns. This protocological examination discusses the 
formation, production, and mutation of agencies and subjectivities through the realities of 
digital information (copying, transference, and distributed storage and file maintenance) 
and the new legal and distributive formation Bittorrent constructs. Likewise, the concept 
of the swarm is not without its own political implications, and I discuss the notion of a 
swarm within a larger context of collaborative labor to illustrate how BitTorrent and 
swarm technologies operationalize existing logics of control and hierarchy. Here, I link 
these logics to collaboration and gender dynamics discussed by rhetoric scholars such as 
Karen Lunsford and Lisa Ede, as well as “global hegemonic masculinities” theorized by 
R.W. Connell (1998). Then, through José Esteban Muñoz (1994) and his theory of 
disidentification, I introduce a possible complimentary mode of protocologial work suited 
for rhetorical network analysis. Munoz writes that 
 
Disidentification is about recycling and rethinking encoded meaning. The 
process of disidentification scrambles and reconstructs the encoded 
message of a cultural text in a fashion that both exposes the encoded 
message’s universalizing and exclusionary machinations and recircuits its 
workings to account for, include, and empower minority identities and 
identifications. (31) 
 
I argue that the digital disidentifacatory move of the Bittorrent protocol is precisely in the 
way in which it exposes and refashions the encoded meanings of the other protocols it 
contends with in order to “crack the code of the majority,” albeit in a different context 
and scale. Building from Chapter One, I argue that digital disidentification is a 
performance that allows us to think about agencies produced by digital media outside the 
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horizon of the humanist, deliberative subject without necessarily giving up a framework 
for political engagement. 
Chapter 4 explores a third case study, this time in the form of cryptocurrency, 
namely Bitcoin. Bitcoin takes the swarm mentality of BitTorrent one step further my 
mobilizing its logic into the operational value of trust. Trust, being centered in a protocol 
(rather than financial institutions) places Bitcoin in the ironic position of critiquing old 
and hegemonic technology while reiterating many gendered norms of finance and abuse 
across Having moved from identity formation to the question of efficacy and action, I 
explore how these questions address a seemingly non-discursive regime. The search for 
meaning, identity, and action within these networks is queered so that Bitcoin, as a 
disidentifacatory performance (it uses many of the techniques associated with Bittorrent), 
muddies how audiences and rhetors function as theoretical concepts, focusing instead on 
the iteration of the Bitcoin network as rhetorical performance itself. Thus “iteration,” in 
the Derridean sense, is played out not only through the network’s own construction of 
itself and its point of articulation, but through the ways in which new forms of persuasive 
action and effects are produced. Iteration and disidentification work with Galloway's 
protocol analysis to form a rhetorical analysis of protocol and emergent agencies, 
including the possibilities for "queering" these networks and how we think about the 
circulation and production of rhetoric. 
Chapters 5 explores the theoretical implications of my case studies, focusing on 
the movement in technology through rhetorical concerns of subjectivity, agency, and 
political engagement. I argue, through the analysis of these three case studies, the ways in 
which subjectivity, agency, and thus politics are products of various technological 
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mediations and techniques that include, but do not require, normative politics of agency 
or rhetoric. Instead, I show a particular mode of networked rhetorics not looking towards 
how networks circulate existing rhetorics and agencies through classical civil and civic 
mechanisms, but rather looking towards a rhetoric of networks and circulation that 
accounts for an ethical, accountable subjectivity or agency based on contingent criteria of 
action mediated through digital technology but still capable of engagement and change. I 
suggest that a rhetoric of circulation understands the generation of social and cultural 
categories within digital communication technology, and further argue for rhetoric’s 
place in the study and theorization of such technology. 
The result is an approach to communication technology that focuses on the 
aspects of that technology that tend to evade scrutiny in terms of social or cultural 
critique. Media theorists have suggested that the actual workings of digital technologies 
are lost on us so long as we maintain a study of surface or interface phenomena. I would 
also suggest that it is difficult to necessarily define where interfaces end and actual 
technology or control mechanisms begin. However, I argue that in the case of source 
code and computer technology, it is not so much the task of media and rhetoric scholars 
to find the origin of technocultural phenomena, but to better understand the continued 
recreation of that phenomena in different communicative contexts. The performativity of 
gender and technology as a method of collaborative labor in circulation is one such 
context.  
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Chapter 2  
Computational Performativity and Queer Code Practices 
 
Introduction 
Digital media is not gender neutral. While many arenas of software development posit a 
gender-blind meritocracy of progress and achievement, the historical and epistemological 
assumptions of the field contradict such utopian visions. As Wendy Chun (2011) writes, 
the original computers were in fact women, literally computing problems given to them 
by (typically male) mathematicians and scientists, plugging away on 1940s state-of-the-
art military-grade hardware (31). This man-woman-machine relationship is the precursor 
to the development of software, and as men stepped into the burgeoning field of 
“programming,” so to was digital media bracketed as prior to or outside gender, 
effectively moving it from the clerical realm of hardware manipulation into the creative 
and intellectual realm of computer science.1 Since women, in many ways, were software 
before there was software, scholars can see digital media as an inherently gendered entity 
develop methods to study technology as a productive and performative aspect of cultural 
epistemologies. Not only does code represent the instructions that eventually come 
together to form software, but it also expresses a set of knowledge-producing practices 
that join programmers and users through a plethora of technological enterprises.   
                                                     
1 The six original ENIAC programmers were Kathleen McNulty, Betty Snyder, Betty Jennings, Marilyn 
Wescoff, Frances Bilas, and Ruth Lichterman. See W. Barkley Fritz, “The Women of ENIAC,” IEEE 
Annals of the History of Computing 18, no. 3 (1996), 15.
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   In this chapter, I argue that one such epistemology, that of “mastery,” exemplifies the 
performative and gendered nature of software and code practices. I situate programming 
as a profession of software production, the result of performative norms of humanistic 
mastery of discourse, technology. Towards this, I extrapolate and refine the concept of 
"computational performativity," drawing from media theorists Katherine Hayles and 
Wendy Chun to put forth that computational performativity is gender performativity. 
Rather than see code as a representation of meaning through representations of texts or 
processes, I utilize several code artifacts to show that software is more accurately 
examined as an ecology of development practices that structure how certain norms 
circulate through software. These practices can be traced through the distinction between 
code as a text (source code, algorithms) and code as software—as made from the 
relationships of multiple, often hidden processes. Inspired by Judith Butler’s (1997) 
assertion that "[t]he linguistic domain over which the subject has no control becomes the 
condition of possibility for whatever domain of control is exercised by the speaking 
subject," I trace how computational performativity functions as a technological 
production of structural masculinity through software (28). Moving away from 
representation as the seat of meaning in code, I see the reading of code as a formal tool to 
discuss how gender works through what I call “contexts of complexity.” Complexity, in 
software engineering, is a constant problem and mechanism that requires that 
programmers strategically hide complexity to produce further, complex software. To read 
code as hidden and hiding, always embedded in contexts beyond its immediate 
application, is essential to understanding how assumptions of discourse propagate 
through that hiding and production.    
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To illustrate my vision of computational performativity, I examine two related 
digital artifacts: Julie Levin Russo's gender-challenging Battlestar Galactica fan fiction 
Slash Goggles and Zach Blas's digital queer art project transCoder. A fictional 
“pseudocode”, Slash Goggles is an algorithm meant to bring together elements of 
computation, fiction, and gender critique. Slash Goggles mobilizes computer 
programming structures and technical communication to present a theoretical piece of 
software that operationalizes sexual identification through characters in the show. The 
programming syntax used as the “language” of Slash Goggles is obtained from 
transCoder, a digital art project that synthesizes software development techniques and 
queer gender theory from thinkers such as Butler, Luce Irigaray, Michel Foucault, and 
Donna Harraway. Using transCoder as a template for Slash Goggles, Russo develops her 
project within a set of computational norms and fictional contexts of complexity that 
perform traditional software engineering practices. As a consequence, Slash Goggles 
implicates her critique and her fan-fiction within a larger critique of digital circulation 
and sexual identity. 
The move from a template library of code in transCoder to a realized procedural 
critique in Slash Goggles demonstrates the performative move of software in iterating 
social and computational norms, and the potential for gender norms to iterate as well. In 
making this argument, I proceed in three parts. First, I define the concept of 
computational performativity through transCoder and Slash Goggles. I show that the 
former structures the latter through what Hayles (2005) describes as the work of 
"revealing and concealing" in software, or the ways in which the "'brute' lower levels" of 
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computation are concealed to engender higher-level order through a mechanism of 
“abstraction” (54) Second, I describe how the relationship between abstraction and 
complexity in code is a performative aspect of the circulation of a masculinized 
epistemology of mastery, in which the subject position articulated by programming as a 
practice rests on assumptions of expertise, individuality, and command. Third, I 
demonstrate how their queer critiques of code open the way for a rhetorical approach of 
computational performativity by way of the discursive potential of what J. Jack 
Halberstam defines as “queer” failure in code. Abstraction as performativity and queer 
failure allow us to recognize code as masculine epistemology, to critique that 
epistemology, and also recognize the productive aspects of that epistemology. 
 
Computational Performativity and Contexts of Complexity 
Describing code as “performative” presents a comparison of code and (or as) language, 
opens up the question of code as discourse, which for some is a contentious analogy to 
make. Because code is not “natural” (ie, human) language, some overwhelmingly see that 
it is immediately constrained by its determined, machinic limitations as compared to 
natural language. Hayles (2005) argues that we cannot describe code in the same way as a 
natural language because code has a more rigorously defined referent in the form of 
hardware and execution structures, of esoteric commands, binary digits, code libraries, 
and electrical pulses--referents that have no antecedents in natural language (54). For 
Hayles, the “effects” produced by computer code invoke, through the execution of code 
as part of software, an unintelligible interlocutor in the form of the machine. It is not 
uncommon for critical and rhetorical scholars to situate code as a symbol system to 
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interpret, and in some respects this is not an entirely unproductive avenue of inquiry, 
even if it only provides a partial image of what software actually is. Robert Cummings 
argues that the purposing of code as a text allows us to better understand how we write 
for human audiences, that there is a communicative relationship between machine 
structures and human writing. The machinic elements of this equation (the programming 
language, the software) are--even though they structure the entire activity-- peripheral to 
the actual activity of writing the code (which, ideally, adheres to relatively 
understandable paradigms of rhetoric, composition, and pedagogy). Likewise, code 
studies scholar Mark Marino (2002) suggests that we can “read” code (or pseudocode) 
like a poem, "a text, a sign system with its own rhetoric, as verbal communication that 
possesses significance in excess of its functional" utility (Marino). This can be a strict 
representational look at the code (what does it say), or, as Ian Bogost (2007) or Kevin 
Brock (2012) suggest, we can look at the rhetoric of an algorithm through the procedure 
outlined by the code or expressed by the software (what does it do, or what does it ask the 
user to do). Algorithmic analysis coincides with the notion of procedure or process as 
discourse, an idea explored through digital realms such as games and software. The queer 
implications of games and software have already been explored to some extent. Edmond 
Chang (2015) argues that games can offer both subversive and normative constructs of 
gender in gameplay through choices offered to the player (9). Bonnie Ruberg (2015) 
further argues that such processes argue opportunities to evoke affective responses 
outside emotions traditionally ascribed to game play--emotions such as sadness, fear, and 
disappointment (111). Such examples acknowledge something other than language or 
representation as meaningful aspects of digital media, and such aspects are also present in 
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code. Since coding as a practice does not necessarily map on to      human-centric 
practice of writing, the limits of a textual interpretation of code are revealed through the 
execution of that code. But, if performativity is less about effects in audiences and more 
about what Butler (1993) argues is not “a singular or deliberative 'act,' but, rather, as the 
reiterative and citational practices by which discourse produces the effect that it names,” 
then we can implicate the network of relationships that make code work as software (xii). 
Software is not “an algorithm” or code, but a network of code libraries producing 
contexts of complexity for execution that cannot be limited by an “audience-interlocutor” 
model, nor reduced to a mediation within such a model. In the examples of Slash Goggles 
and transCoder, computational performativity is demonstrated through the artwork of 
queer digital activists’ representations of code and software, and opens up to an 
investigation of how computational performativity can produce gendered effects. Because 
Hayles qualifies the notion that code is a language by implicating the computer itself as 
an audience, she qualifies code as a mediation of intention and logic between humans and 
machines. She accordingly resists a Derridean notion of language’s infinite citationality 
and iterability--since code is tied to a knowable context (that of execution, of the 
machine), at some point “signifiers must point to signifieds,” and commands must work 
within a tight constraint of “correctness” to execute (Hayles 48). Derrida’s description of 
language as always already a citation of previous utterances-- utterances that iterate 
outside of the presences of their author--ends logically at the artifice of hardware. 
Therefore, the writing of code is not directly connected to the execution of that code 
through that act of writing: there are intermediary steps during the computational process 
29 
 
that      programmers and writers do not engage, which seemingly ends the endless play 
of signification present in natural language. 
Within this discussion of code and execution, note that when Cummings, Marino, 
and Hayles refers to “code,” they more specifically mean “source” code. Source code is 
the code that programmers write, modify, and compile as part of the software 
development process. This differs from machine code, which is expressed in binary or 
hexadecimal numerical form and corresponds directly with the processes occurring in 
computer processing and memory. Non-technical audiences are familiar with source code 
through representations of programming in popular media, with focused hackers, spies, or 
scientists typing away while lines of mathematical-looking statements scroll down a 
screen. While esoteric and difficult to understand, it is relatively translatable because 
source code more closely resembles a natural language. The simplest example of 
executable source code for most programming languages is the “Hello World” program, 
often used as a beginning lesson in programming textbooks and tutorials. “Hello World” 
in the C programming language looks like the following: 
 
#include <stdio.h> 
int main( ){ 
 
printf("hello, world\n"); 
return 0; 
 
} 
 
While the meaning of the commands evades non-programmers, it takes very little effort 
to translate: within a main function (int main) it prints (printf) the sentence “Hello 
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Figure 2.1 Slash Goggles 
World” plus a line break (“\n”) to the screen. This is, for all intents and purposes, a 
complete program. Similarly, Slash Goggles is a representation of source code: 
    
 
 
 
 
 
   
    
 
 
 
 
 This code, while dense and probably confusing to most, still provides a foundation for 
“reading” some of the intended meaning of the author. Unlike “Hello World,” Slash 
Goggles is “pseudocode,” or non-executable text written as code in order to map the logic 
of an algorithm. Pseudocode represents a sort of conceptual, non-executable “draft” 
version of a future piece of code. 
Russo (2008) posted Slash Goggles to her Livejournal blog The Archive2, 
described by Russo as "experimental fan works for Battlestar Galactica season 4 and 
beyond," The blog  organizes its contents around a shared interest in Galactica and the 
identity-challenging themes present in the show. Slash Goggles addresses Galactica's 
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themes directly through the conceit of the Cylon--human-like cyborgs who experience 
emotions like pain, fear, and sexual desire, and who inevitably model their identities upon 
(and serve as model for) their human counterparts. 
The blog post ("the Slash Goggles algorithm") contains the Slash Goggles code, a 
description of that code, and a series of images from the series, photoshopped with 
thought bubbles that reflect what the outcome of the algorithm is. As such, Russo's fan 
fiction more closely resembles a documentation page for software than a fictional 
narrative, including descriptions of how the code works and an implementation guide. 
This documentation describes Slash Goggles as a program that "establishes, based on 
visual data, the variant sexual preferences of human subjects," a program that helps 
Cylons understand human sexual orientation and and "improve HCI" (Human-Computer 
Interaction) (Russo). 
The fictional language Slash Goggles portrays ("Cylon COre Language--CyCL) 
functionally and textually represents scripting languages like PHP or JavaScript. It starts 
with (1) a function declaration ("function slash_goggles($desire)") that signals the 
beginning of the algorithm by way of naming it. Functions are, much like basic algebra, 
names that "stand in" for larger computational formulas that involve variables. In this 
case, "slash_goggles" names the function, and defines what variable data it takes as input 
($desire). Words beginning with a dollar sign ('$') designate variables. Like math 
problems, variables take a value such as a number or a string of words assigned by the 
program in order to do work with or on that value. Following that, a series of sub-
procedures accomplish component operations: checking activation status (2), defining 
subjects (3), verifying data (4), parsing that data (5), and using that data to computer 
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some sort of gender identification (6). Slash Goggles takes as input the variable 
"$desire," which immediately implicates some sort of value that quantifies or represents 
input that has been assigned to represent "desire" by some other program. Then, in a 
series of smaller sub-procedures, the algorithm accomplishes a set of tasks seemingly 
integral to the identification of sexuality. The "exactness" of code in expressing a 
procedure through concrete statements and quantifiable results demands a specificity that 
Slash Goggles both leans upon for its rhetorical effectiveness and, at the same time 
distorts, through linguistic ambiguity. 
Slash Goggles critiques and destabilizes both gender and computation as purely 
mechanical or determined categories, and questions the distinction between the two by 
staging sexual identification as a procedure. Since the code represents a procedure, Russo 
also includes some fictional "output" of the code. Images from the show featuring human 
characters, seemingly viewed through the point of view of a Cylon, are given thought 
bubbles that articulate that character's sexual desires, frustrations, and complexities. 
Figures 2 and 3 represent the results of the algorithm as the Cylon characters (in first-
person point of view) gaze upon the human characters. 
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Figure 2.3 Cylons Using Slash Goggles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Cylons using Slash Goggles (2) 
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Within the framework of her fan-fiction, Russo suggests that this algorithm is similar to 
human recognition of sexuality ("gaydar"), and explains that Slash Goggles represents the 
procedural work of ascertaining a shifting, fluid sexuality that is drawn from, but not 
determined by, social dynamics and negotiated subjectivities. 
The Slash Goggles operation/algorithm describes the negotiation of sexual 
identification. Here, we can start to look for textual clues to interpret what Slash Goggles 
attempts to express as a critique, because the ambiguity between the language of the code 
and its use as code helps constructs the potential meanings of Slash Goggles. Readers 
unfamiliar with code may still pick up on references to sexuality, gender, and queer 
epistemologies in phrases like "theCloset," "buggery()" and references to the body, 
identity, and gender. Those familiar with coding will also notice the programming 
structures that meaningfully situate those references. For example, in "defining subjects" 
(Section 3 in Figure 1), Slash Goggles iterates over each element in $humanform (which, 
as suggested by the code, contains at least one, if not more, discrete elements) and assigns 
a value based on visual data ascribed to a variable "$body." 
The rest of the algorithm follows suit, and calls to functions that reference 
"theCloset," destabilization, and performance suggest a similar reliance on contextual, yet 
open and circulating, interpretations of subjects and their sexualities. As Eve Sedgwick 
(1990) argues, the "closet" is "a performance initiated as such by the speech act of 
silence--not a particular silence, but a silence that accrues particularity by fits and starts, 
in relation to the discourse that surrounds and differentially constitutes it” (32). The use 
of “theCloset” as a code term suggests a self-orientation (is the Cylon subject 'in' the 
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closet? Can the Cylon perform or express desire? How does this orient the Cylon towards 
the subject of their view?) and a cultural orientation constructed by the ability to speak or 
the necessity of remaining silent and/or hidden. More directly, "theCloset" plays a part in 
construction of sexual knowledge for the Cylon--if “theCloset” is 'null', meaning without 
value, then the algorithm begins openly constructing data based on sexual traits gained 
from interpretation of the "$body". The computation of a sexual identification of the 
other is already based on the viewer's interpretation of the other, which is inherently 
incomplete and limited, but informed by the available (and, conversely, the unavailable) 
information. 
The algorithm queers sexual identity and identification as well as computation, 
both in its language and its formal structure. The wording of commands as recognizable 
ideas in gender and queer theory are mobilized within programmatic constructs like 
conditional statements, iterating loops, and variables to express a structural critique of 
sexual identification. By taking a seemingly determined media format (computer code) 
and using it to demonstrate an ambiguous process, Russo suggests that it simply is not 
enough to say "sexual identification is ambiguous" or that "gender is dynamic and 
interpreted," but instead calls for the reader to walk through the difficulty of 
operationalizing such a task. As Erin Davis writes, "[i]dentification occurs within a social 
regime of normative expectations and guidelines that shape everyone's possibilities for 
self-representation," and that gender identity is not “static, but it is also not unbounded.” 
Literally, in this case, identification is bound by structure and syntax. In this way, 
potential identification is implicated in logical structures and interconnected activities not 
entirely expressible through procedural understanding. Values, epistemologies, 
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foundations of activity and knowledge, are all continually (re)expressed in these code 
relationships, even as they are hidden. The expression and critique of sexual 
identification is linked, through the use of the algorithm and code as medium for such 
expression, to a resistance to any notion of an algorithmic reduction of sexual 
identification as a process and to the reduction of a process as something rote or 
determined. The underlying performativity connects these approaches as critiques of code 
and sexual identification, with shared concepts of determination and agency. The 
connection between these two performative moves is linked through the underlying 
performative nature of the computational system, and in particular through the gendered 
nature of that system. 
Much as Russo situates identity and identification as a procedure, the underlying 
work of code implies a realm of computation and execution in excess of a code’s 
meaning. We must therefore situate code as a performative structure outside of strict 
interpretations of author-intended meaning. Taking source code as the origin or center of 
meaning, according to Wendy Chun (2008), erases the distinction between code and 
execution, conflating the meaning of that code with its effects in computer execution 
(303). This represents how, according to Chun, how source code is “fetishized” by 
scholars as the seat of meaning (Chun 309). To fetishize is to erroneously assume that the 
full meaning of the code is exposed as the source is exposed. Performative code, 
however, places something like “Hello World” or Slash Goggles outside its author as the 
seat of meaning. As a given piece of software is most commonly tens of thousands (if not 
millions) of lines of code, the functioning of that software is predicated not simply on a 
given algorithm, but on the relationships between algorithms in different code libraries 
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and how user input circulates between their execution. If execution and code are separate 
and under erasure, as Chun argues, meaning cannot be invested strictly in the source 
code, but within the erasure of the underlying execution of that code--which includes the 
hiding of hardware and the hiding of underlying code libraries and algorithms. The 
technique of hiding execution is known in computer science as “abstraction,” a method 
where complex computational processes are hidden or “abstracted” from users behind 
simpler interfaces to facilitate easier, more streamlined programming. 
   Abstraction is the mechanism of computational performativity, because this 
erasure allows the development of complex software from already-existing complexity. A 
good example of this is the software development kit (SDK). The idea of an SDK harkens 
back to the previous discussion of hiding complexity: an SDK provides programmers 
with code interfaces that allow them to produce software for complex platforms. A good 
example of this is the development of software for mobile devices like smart phones. 
Android and Apple iPhones are incredibly complex machines, and the code necessary to 
do even the simplest task (like draw a window to a screen, or connect to the Internet) 
would be monstrous if each app on that platform required programmers to do each from 
scratch for every program. Therefore, these platforms have dedicated SDKs, written in a 
given programming language (Java for Android, Objective C for iPhone) that hides the 
complexity of hardware and software interaction so that better, more complex apps can 
be built faster and more reliably. The code required to have an Android phone draw a 
window to the monitor requires mathematical computations to determine size and 
orientation, contents, and the very context from which the window comes into being and 
presents itself to the user (including where to store this in memory, how to toggle 
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between user contexts, etc.). When every task requires hundreds, if not thousands, of 
procedures, suddenly a simple program becomes almost unthinkably complex. However, 
with the SDK, the command to create a window and start an app is reduced to about a 
dozen lines of code, none of which require an app developer to manually manage 
hardware, data resources, or the operating system Thus an SDK is an abstraction of the 
underlying complexity of the phone that allows for the quick and reliable deployment of 
software for that phone. 
   Abstraction points us towards the performative because it incorporates 
regulatory practices outside of the code that we write, and these regulatory practices often 
consist of assumptions about how people work and communicate. In "The Performativity 
of Code," Adrian Mackenzie (2005) argues that software can represent "a form of 
collective agency in the process of constituting itself” (73). Using the operating system 
Linux as his example, Mackenzie writes that the ¨ongoing constitution is performative 
with respect to the efficacy of Linux as a technical object and with respect to the 
fabrication of Linux as a cultural identity” (73). For Mackenzie, Linux regulates its own 
constitution through a series of norms of practices that are within its own code, which 
then circulate through the social body of developers that utilize it. This echoes Butler’s 
(1990) argument that performativity is a production of subjectivity and sex through the 
iterative power of discourse (133). That is, it  
is not an act or performance accomplished by some actor, but the continued 
(re)production of norms, rules, logics, a reproduction that becomes naturalized or 
seemingly necessary as it materializes and rematerializes itself. Software "would have to 
be understood not just in terms of the meanings ascribed to it, or in terms of its effects on 
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Figure 2.4 transCoder 
the movements of data and information in communication networks. Rather, it would be 
an objectification of a linguistic praxis” (Mackenzie 76). Thus software must contain 
within itself the logic of its own reproduction. However, to stay close to Butler rather 
than, say, Derrida, I turn to an example of abstraction that retains Butler’s investment in 
gender: Blas's transCoder. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Burned and distributed on CD-ROMS or as packaged files available for download 
through Zach Blas's Queer Technologies website, the transCoder package appears a 
simple collection of unordered .txt files with names like "about.txt," "libraries.txt," 
"compiler.txt." transCoder, like Slash Goggles, is pseudo code, but whereas Slash 
Goggles mimics an algorithm, transCoder more closely resembles an SDK. Marino 
(2012) describes transCoder as a "provocative kit" that "uploads counter-cultural 
ontologies (or anti-ontologies) into the normalized logic of software. He is transcoding 
theory into a programming language” (189). The accuracy and importance of this 
description is evident in that, unlike the source code of Slash Goggles, what we see here 
is not an algorithm. In fact, without some prior knowledge of how code functions, we 
might not have any clue what we are looking at, outside of some recognizable names and 
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references. In the above example, Blas structures a Butlerian concept of iteration and 
power through the programmatic statement "destabilizationLoop()," and a play on speech 
act theory with a series of "executable speech acts" (such as “iDo()” and “exe()”). 
transCoder, as an SDK, does not provide a series of code statements that represent the 
procedures underlying the command “destabilizationLoop().” Instead, the user is given a 
short description on how “destabilizationLoop()” should be used. Or, it tells the user what 
it does, and not how it does it. "destabilizationLoop()" "breaks apart any process that acts 
as a continuously iterating power", which implies Butler's assertion that gender and sex 
are products of regulatory regimes but, through changes during the iteration of such 
regulative norms (or loops), resistance to such regimes can emerge (Butler 1990, 130). 
The ambiguity of meaning, however, emerges from transCoder because meaning is only 
"implied," as there is no actual code, only the promise of code functionality, because the 
underlying complexity has already been abstracted from the user. transCoder doesn't 
define an operation, but the potential foundation for the building of operations, a syntax 
for further operational complexity, out of the interface of promised functionality. So 
rather than see the work of code as the process of negotiating meaning between a mind 
and a machine, between language and hardware, we instead see a performativity of code 
through logical structure. 
Calling back to Slash Goggles, Russo utilizes "destabilizationLoop()" in a 
programmatic construct meant to control the flow of a program through decision-making: 
If (destabilizationLoop('image')){ 
 
$desire = array(mutMutate('identity', 'gender')); 
 
} 
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Since "destabilizationLoop()" breaks apart any process as an iterating power, the use of 
an “image” suggests the undermining of stable gender categories constructed through 
visual interpretation. This code snippet checks uses the "if " statement to check the results 
of “destabilizationLoop()”. If it returns a “true,” which seems to occur if the loop actually 
disrupts the iterating power of the image, then the variable "$desire" gains a series of 
values resultant from the "mutMutate('identity', 'gender');" statement. "mutMutate()" can 
"connect any number of items to generate hybrid functions, operators, variables, etc.," 
and because of this, once the iterating power of “image” is broken, then “$desire” 
contains the possible hybrid connections of identity and gender. All of the operations 
described above are rendered meaningful through the framework of transCoder, in that 
the use of transCoder’s code calls upon a pre-existing coding context. The fact that we 
know nothing about how “destabilizationLoop()” actually breaks an iterating power 
demonstrates how my reading can extrapolate meaning from Slash Goggles, and how 
something as seemingly ambiguous as “destabilizationLoop()” still performs within the 
context of computer code. There is no necessary revelation of transCoder’s code, but 
only the performative structure that transCoder creates. 
Also note here a few additional lines from transCoder's libraries.txt. file: 
 
schizoA() 
 
Replicates exponentially and erratically 
 
buggery() 
 
acts upon a function or data set and generates an array of monstrous non-
logic mutations. (Blas 2012) 
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Both of these functions are found in Slash Goggles. Russo, using the "schizoA()" and 
"buggery()" functions, fills in some gaps as to how each functions works (variables, 
input, etc.) by deploying them in a particular way (allocating value, passing variables as 
input), but their place within a program is articulated through transCoder. When Slash 
Goggles calls "'metatext => buggery('queer,' vBody());" as a command, we may now 
infer from the documentation that the quality "metatext" takes as its value the result of the 
"buggery()" function when given the inputs "queer" and the result of another function, 
"vBody()" (which "detonates a time bomb of radical impurity”) (Blas 2012). The result is 
that "metatext" will contain some value gained through the process of generating non-
logics of identitarian non-purity related to queer sexuality, which will then become part 
of a data structure used to understand sexuality--in this case, the object “$humanform.” 
The movement of structure, meaning, and subject articulation is a product of the citation 
and reiteration of norms laid out in the library. However, unlike a natural language, the 
abstraction of complexity, and not the language itself, that serves as the performative 
engine. 
As Chun writes, scholars may fetishize their analyses of source code as the central 
artifact of meaning, one with a relatively transparent performative relationship to the 
underlying machine (Chun 2011, 29). Coding qua writing thus becomes a translatable 
practice between the goals of machine execution and audience persuasion. While this 
may not be untrue--in that coding is, in this paradigm, writing--it places the impetus of 
the practice of coding within a realm of human intelligibility and as a directed activity 
between writing subject and technology, one that adheres to already-existing approaches 
to writing informed by traditional discursive models. Abstraction problematizes this 
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while at the same time iterating social norms, including sexuality and gender, because 
abstraction illustrates code as a logical interface between contexts of complexity. These 
interfaces are code libraries, like transCoder: they simplify the use of complex code so 
that programmers can build more complex structures. Chun (2004) writes that 
"abstraction both empowers the programmer and insists on his/her ignorance . . . 
abstraction gives programmers new creative abilities” (38). The work of a programmer is 
therefore mediated through a series of logical translations across digital media, and this 
mediation is more or less hidden from the programmer at the site of the production of 
code. Abstraction through interfaces between contexts of complexity produce 
programming subject positions and articulates a power 
structure iterating a particular norm of software production. TransCoder and Slash 
Goggles inject queer sexual identification into the performative mechanism to circulate 
queer identities and world making practices into code itself. Such an injection produces 
productive discursive strategies for digital rhetoric and queer critique of code. 
 
The Queer Performativity of Code and Subverting Mastery 
What becomes evident here is that the productive mechanism of computational 
performativity is no more determined by rote and determined technology than gender by 
rote and determined biology. In regards to gender performativity, Kendell Gerdes (2008) 
writes that, "the subject of gender is not in charge, but exposed, addressed by the 
performative power of essentialist understanding of gender rather than the addresser of it 
. . . the performative power of gender is its ceaseless materialization of gender," and I 
would argue that in computational performativity, the same could be said about the 
44 
 
subject of technology (148). In this sense, not only are there constraints to performativity 
but rather, "constraint calls to be rethought as the very condition of performativity” 
(Butler 1993, 59). The subject of computation is addressed by the performative power of 
code through a continual reference to something else -- some structure, some language, 
some order, that it manifests through. There is no stable "machinic subject" in place as 
we perform identities in online social networks, through medical databases, and so on. 
There is only the constant production of those subjectivities, and their transformation 
across various performative machines. In this way, it avoids the presumption of a 
metaphysics of the subject where there is a "stable gender in place and intact prior to the 
expressions and activities that we understand as gendered expressions and activities” 
(Butler 2010, 147). 
   From this, a compelling overlap between computational and gender 
performativities emerges. Both Chun and Mackenzie draw from Butler to argue towards a 
performativity of code. Both, however, do so more focused on the performativity rather 
than the gender. If computational performativity is the citation and iteration of 
complexity across different programming contexts, then I argue that a of masculine 
epistemology of mastery is structurally embedded within code. Drawing from Chun's 
account of the history of the ENIAC Girls, a parallel, gendered rhetoric of mastery with 
computational performativity shows how subjects are formed in programming and 
software. Leveraging a discourse of mastery within software development links code to 
what J. Jack Halberstam calls “queer art of failure,” a resistance to the determined and 
correct (masterful) narratives of computer programming. Slash Goggles, as an 
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articulation of transCoder's logic, thus suggests that its proceduralizing of sexual 
identification is also an articulation and critique of mastery as an epistemology. 
According to Chun, the earliest days of contemporary programming involved a 
large, room-sized computer, the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC), 
a military project developed to help calculate artillery tables and formulas related to the 
development of thermonuclear weapons during World War 2. Built in the Electrical 
Engineering department of Pennsylvania State University, the computer did not use 
software. In fact, there was no such thing as software. Instead, ENIAC programming was 
the direct, physical programming of the wires, switches, and other components of the 
machine itself. There was no “code” distinct from the bare metal of the technology itself. 
The “computers” were a group of women known as the “ENIAC girls,” female engineers 
who operated the machine directly. These women understood the hardware of the ENIAC 
and how to instantiate solutions to problems given to them by (male) mathematicians and 
scientists in processes that could take days or weeks. The objectification of these women 
under a normative understanding of knowledge and discipline continued through their 
orientation as extensions of that machine. The kind of machine work the ENIAC girls 
performed was seen as, itself, rote and mechanical rather than creative of intellectual, and 
such work was often seen as mindless, unskilled, or “clerical.” However, after the 
invention of “software” and code as we know them today, there was an epistemological 
collapse of the work of programming and of problem posing and solving, and the image 
of the lone, brilliant computer programmer came into existence. Chun writes that 
“programming became programming and software became software when command 
shifted from commanding a 'girl' to commanding a machine,” and following this the 
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model constructed around “commanding a girl” became a foundation for machine control 
as well (29). As it became more abundantly clear that programming itself was a skill 
worth studying, and as men began to apply scientific epistemologies to describe software 
and programming as practices, then the programmer became a figure of knowledge, 
expertise, and mastery. No more a cleric of repetitious activities, the programmer was a 
priest of a “black art,” as John Backus famously described, in which experts handled the 
arcane through self-driven brilliance and know-how. Nathan Ensmenger (2010) argues 
that programming thus became masculine when it moved toward categorization as the 
individual practice of the intellectual “artisan” or the rigorous “scientist” (130). 
It is here, in the mistaken assumption that commands may translate directly into 
machinic code, that the gendered notion of mastery articulates as abstraction and 
computational performativity. The erasure of complexity is productive in that, in order to 
produce the conditions of a mastering discursive subject, it erases the invisible and 
collaborative labor of encoding, translation, and automation in software. Mastery, in this 
case, is rendered masculine because of its historical nature and because of its 
epistemological assumptions--the productivity of individual realization through erasure of 
shared labor. Mastery is the erasure of the intermediary, the investment of creative and 
productive authority in the articulated individual of code. Abstraction as a technique does 
ease development for programmers, constructing that discursive, subject of mastery, but 
does so through a willful erasure of the limits and debts of such mastery. Chun notes that 
“the handing over of power that has been hidden by programming languages that obscure 
the machine and highlight programming” situates a “master” as an individual, a master 
not just of the technology but of the epistemology of that technology. The narrative of 
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mastery is predicated on the strategic abstraction of information to constitute agency 
within another context. In this case, is constitutes a position of agency in which a system 
(the programming language) is mastered. 
Blas argues that transCoder “disidentifies” with technology, he does so to argue 
that it introduces queer critical theory into a seemingly non-queer space, modifying the 
circulation of information and identity. Drawing from José Esteban Muñoz (1999), for 
transCoder to disidentify means that transCoder 
 
scrambles and reconstructs the encoded message of a cultural text in a 
fashion that both exposes the encoded message’s universalizing and 
exclusionary machinations and re-circuits its workings to account for, 
include, and empower minority identities and identifications. Thus, 
disidentification is a step further than cracking open the code of the 
majority; it proceeds to use this code as raw material for representing a 
disempowered politics or positionality that has been rendered unthinkable 
by the dominant culture. (31) 
 
However, both transCoder and Slash Goggles disidentify specifically because, by 
subverting narratives of code as rote and determined, they further subvert narratives of 
mastery as epistemological totalities. By utilizing abstraction (and software engineering 
more broadly) itself as a tactic, rather than as a bracketed epistemology, both introduce 
into the mastered (or “master-able”) space of software the circular, problematic nature of 
sexual identification, which further, as a performative result, raises and owns the 
potential and necessity of the failure of that mastery. For Halberstam (2011), failure 
locates within hegemonic systems of normativity avenues of identification and 
subversion (89). In an arena like computer programming, incorrectness or failed code is 
seen as doomed from the get go--it simply crashes and burns. But if failure is a 
productive performance through contexts of complexity, rather than in the tight confines 
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of the execution of an algorithm, then failure as a practice can encompass a wider critique 
of masculine culture in programming. Accordingly, one of Halberstam’s theses of failure 
is that we must “resist mastery” (Halberstam 11). Resisting mastery does not mean 
simply writing failed algorithms, but writing structural critiques through performative 
mechanisms that circulate confusion and drives code logics to illogical ends. 
Resisting mastery here means resisting the disciplining urge to reproduce, to 
correct, to maintain, that compels code workers in corporate and academic contexts. Code 
or software as illogical seems like a contradiction, but only so when the meaning of a 
given piece of code is invested in the correctness of an algorithm. Bugs, memory leaks, 
security breaches are all results of the failure of code that escapes correctness, as they all 
demonstrate the inherent fallibility of the code that always already exists. They are the 
artifacts of code that escapes its epistemological telos of mastery, which means 
recognizing the frayed edges of failure that lurks in code inherently, and where this 
undermines and complicates mastery. Take the “Hello World” example used earlier. The 
“printf” statement stands as the only real “command” outside of the program structure 
and header. Printf literally prints a string of characters to the screen, with that string given 
to the command as an argument. Since it does this, many programmers embed printf 
statements into their code for debugging purposes, printing warning messages or data 
values to trace the workings of the program. The implication for the programmer, and 
more often the new programmer, is that printf will “just print” to the output screen when 
that line of code executes. New programmers often find out that this is not the case, as 
development variables and errors in compilation can stall out printf so that it prints at the 
wrong time or not at all. That is because printf actually works through an output buffer 
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system, were the string of characters are placed in memory until a specific symbol is 
reached (“\n”), which then “flushes” (empties) the buffer and puts the data on screen. 
StackExchange user Toby Speight found this out during an entry level C programming 
assignment.2 His example illustrates how failure is part of coding. His program, which 
calls the printf command, only “printed” at odd times, or not at all, and certainly not as 
expected. The culprit, in this case, was in the way his development environment compiled 
the command and executed it--more specifically, in how it handled the buffering and 
flushing of the data itself. As individuals began to offer solutions on the website, the 
actual underpinnings of the simple printf command were actually incredibly complex. 
One user “kliteyn” suggested that Toby try to reset the output buffer with the following 
command: 
setvbuf (stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0); 
 
While another user “Kitchi” suggested switching output buffers more generally, using the 
“stderr” (error) output buffer. Another solution suggested, and one prominent in other 
areas that I have researched, is the “fflush” command, which immediately flushes output 
buffers regardless of what else is happening. 
Even simple scripts like Toby’s or the “Hello World” program are always already 
built on an ocean of complex code, libraries through which data and system states are 
passed, transformed, worked on, and returned. Thinking of code through queer failure 
                                                     
2 See the entire discussion thread at: http://stackoverflow.com/questions/13035075/printf-not-printing-
on-console. StackExchange is a forum through which users may ask questions, usually technical in 
nature, and have them answered by others. It works through a karma system where successful or useful 
answers are given votes, while unhelpful answers or repetitive questions are, by the rules of the site, 
ignored or rerouted.
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thus recognizes the avenues by which “failure” is less the breakdown of a program or a 
piece of software, and more a path of subverting or disidentifying with the disciplinary 
structure of programming through programming. In the above case, it recognizes the 
tenuous relationship of “mastery” in the face of such complexity, and the productive 
constitution of mastery as it breaks down and reforms under a necessary admission of 
ignorance and need for collaboration. Understanding a command like printf as a 
command for a machine hides the machinic work that makes printf function and, at the 
same time, the fluid nature in which libraries, compilation, and execution exceed and 
problematize the completeness of that understanding. The abstraction of the language, of 
the underlying complexity, therefore constructs a discursive subject that on the one hand 
can practice a supposed or assumed mastery of code while at the same time including the 
necessity of collaboration, of consultation. The parallels between the pseudocode 
examples of transCoder, Slash Goggles, and “Hello World” are such that the ghosts of 
gendered labor and gendered identification in programming epistemologies ask for 
different, sometimes complementary and sometimes contradictory, approaches. 
Primarily, the exactness of mastery situates itself as masculine, practiced in code that 
always cites the abstract structure of its predecessors and reiterates them. 
Thus transCoder and Slash Goggles, outside of their own critique, also offer a 
critical rhetorical strategy for grappling with gender, sexuality, and code by directly 
injecting it into the performative apparatus of software development. If we trace how 
code abstracts and separates contexts of complexity from each other, how it functions as 
an epistemological performance, then the possibilities for understanding software as a 
gendered practice are more apparent to us. This is why Ensmenger’s claim that coding 
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became a boy’s club is so relevant. For Ensmenger, the building of masculine 
epistemologies around the practice of code marginalized women out of the field: it 
required more work and more overhead in terms of learning style. The representation of 
women in programming has always been a problem, in particular in places where gender-
neutral narratives of achievement, merit, and expertise are stronger (many open source 
development projects fall under this category). 
Butler writes that it is this constitutive failure of the performative, this slippage 
between “discursive command and its appropriated effect” that “provides the linguistic 
occasion and index for a consequential disobedience” (Butler 1997, 24). Or, as Sara 
Ahmed (2006) argues, the demands and prohibitions "of fields or grounds for action are 
generative: it is not that bodies, objects, inhabit structure, but that bodies are expressed, 
inflected, and oriented by their grounding” (558). Blas's move to define an SDK that 
abstracts complexity pulls us away from trying to figure out the "code" that makes it all 
work. This same abstraction allows the movement of meaning by structuring the ability 
of programmers to build further complexity through interfaces like an SDK. The 
performativity of gender and the performativity of digital code share an important aspect: 
that they constitute logics of circulation, one of gender expression, one of software and 
information. These logics of circulation do not carry meaning but produce it, generate it 
and its conditions. In networked space, this also includes how bodies are translated across 
grounds of action, between and through them. These activities, epistemologies, and 
practices are seemingly played out in a space that should be more strictly bounded. 
Computer technology, however, is not, and at some point the erasure of distinction 
between execution and code grounds itself in the mastery of the totality of computation. 
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But as Slash Goggles and transCoder show us, there is always already a break in the 
narrative of mastery: the computer evades us. 
 
Conclusion 
Practices of coding, are not represented strictly in terms of words, statements, or 
commands, but in a structural relationship between these commands and a space of 
intelligibility that the programmer works in, which is turn constructed through a series of 
translations and transpositions across differing computational contexts. It is perhaps 
unsurprising, then, that the question of how gender functions as a discourse within 
technology is further complicated with questions about how gendered practices 
materialize in computer code through different contexts. If gendered practices exist at the 
level of code structure, and not just in the text of a program itself, then code as a 
discourse relies on structural relationships that are unique to code, that only partially 
resemble language. If we choose to bracket certain technological questions such as the 
structure of code as a practice of building software, it may lead us to miss important 
realizations about that technology. In an interview with Rhizome, Blas stated that the 
work of the Queer Technologies project (of which transCoder is a part) is to explore a 
"viral" aesthetics. For Blas, "[b]y making and mass-producing 'products,' Queer 
Technologies is able to exist in a variety of contexts without necessarily being identified 
as an art object . . . They are all designed to to be collective engagements, to be 
collectively experimented with” (Gaboury 2010). Furthermore, such experiments can 
help us examine how “heterosexual mathematicians and scientists create models and 
technologies that are infused with heterosexuality,” and how “homosexual desires can 
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inform and help to materially construct the technicity of objects” Blas and Cardenas 
2013, 561). 
Blas demonstrates the necessary trans-contextuality of transCoder and the fluid 
nature of its subject matter not only to express gender critique, but to structure platforms 
for a dynamic critique of computation and sexuality. Even though sexuality and 
computation seem like disparate topics, Blas looks under the socio-cultural 
manifestations of computer programming, computer culture, and gender to comment on 
the epistemological practices of computer programming, which are themselves structured 
by modes of being that include gendered and sexed practices of communicating and 
producing knowledge. Slash Goggles inhabits this space in order to proceduralize sexual 
identification, exposing the ways in which one is not without the other, if we care to trace 
the performance of gender--and other categories--systemically across digital media. 
Through a conglomeration of rhetorical code practices and performative investigations, 
scholars will begin to see how seemingly disparate texts, materials, or technologies 
actually co-constitute one another. The critical is more than ever experimental, in the 
place where experimentation seems the most constrained. 
This essay demonstrates how computational performativity is a gender 
performativity. This is not simply the production of effects in machines and users, but the 
production of subject positions tied to gendered epistemological practices. Both Russo 
and Blas respond to the rhetoric of software engineering, the how of code circulation and 
performance, to comment on topics of gender construction, sexual identity, and how both 
play out in digital technology. But, as I have argued, this critique expands into a queer 
technique of rhetorical engagement with code that recognizes how structure, form, data, 
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and complexity shape and constrain discursive positions in coding as a discipline. 
Computational performativity, in the manner I have discussed, offers the potential to look 
for gendered practices across computer code--not as representations of gender through 
discourse, but as the ordering of media and media consumption as gendered to produce 
discourse. While I believe there are numerous implications for the application of such 
analysis, the primary vision of this argument is to offer an approach that recognizes code 
as epistemology, epistemology as gendered and performative, and as such the potential to 
see a continuum of gendered practices across software and its use. Such a vantage, I 
believe, offers two immediate benefits. 
First, scholars of a critically queer code studies can develop a body of work that 
explores the relationships between gender representations in STEM industries and 
academia through software--its production, maintenance, and circulation. Because 
performativity, computational and gendered, is the continued creation of new worlds, a 
focus on the queering of software at its own game is a critical imperative. Second, as 
studies in the fields of computer science, computer engineering, and electrical 
engineering have already begun to note the skewed representation of cis-gendered 
masculinity in programming, a productive interdisciplinary framework between STEM 
and studies in queer sexualities can emerge from a shared critical discourse. An 
increasing number of studies from the fields of computer science and software 
engineering point towards gender and racial disparities, not just evident in hiring patterns 
but in how these fields unknowingly invite or exclude certain individuals through their 
cultural assumptions and teaching and working practices. While questions of literacy, 
education, and social attitudes towards gender and engineering all play into these 
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conversations, critical gender scholars can collaborate with these fields to further 
investigate how these social realities are present and productive in software. 
Collaboration in this key stands not only as a corrective measure, but as a way to inform 
how computer scientists produce software, digital subjectivities, and with them our 
contemporary culture. 
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Chapter 3  
BitTorrent, Swarms, and Collaboration 
 
Introduction 
Digital technologies structure how we work with one another. While this has immediate 
and intuitive ramifications for those who use technology, it takes on a different scope and 
scale when applied to those who produce this technology. Free software pioneer Richard 
Stallman wrote in the "The GNU Manifesto" (1985) that "[s]oftware sellers want to 
divide users and conquer them," referring to the way software companies sought to 
impose traditional licensing and copyright models to source code. What makes his 
manifesto significant, as Stallman himself points out, is that "users" are also the 
"producers” (i.e., programmers), and produce by sharing information like code that would 
normally remain proprietary. The conceptual collapse of the user and the producer raised 
(for Stallman) key questions about how access to information structured collaborative 
work. Building software was not like building a car—it is not enough that everyone does 
his or her job, but that everyone understands how their work contributes to a larger 
process of programming. Along these lines, we must admit that large, production-grade 
software rarely comes to fruition through the hard work of a single laborer, but rather 
through teams of engineers, communicators, and managers that negotiate and interpret 
the vision of a project through a cultural feedback loop that runs through different 
contexts of expertise, enactment, and exclusion or inclusion. 
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   The figure of the lone, brilliant programmer persists in many areas of software 
development, primarily emerging from stereotypes connected to academic computer 
science and representations of awkward, often socially maladjusted technical specialists 
who dwell in the bowels of some server room to emerge to help with troubleshooting or 
maintenance. The previous chapter articulated the ways in which mastery functions 
within a gendered framework of labor rooted in a professional history where mastery is 
made synonymous with masculinity to the exclusion of a clerical “feminine” workforce. 
Alongside this, the notion that programming, software engineering, or computer 
administration was ostensibly a masculine pursuit continued into professional and 
academic contexts for decades. 
I believe that there is an ironic relationship between masculinized technology and 
the question of collaboration. This chapter continues this line of thought by examining 
the relationship between technological objects and how they express modes of 
collaboration within that same industry, and how those modes correlate to gendered 
assumptions of collaborative labor and communication. My primary area of examination 
is the file sharing protocol BitTorrent. Popular understanding of BitTorrent is a bit 
limited, in part because it has a certain mystique as something targeted for those who are 
more technologically savvy. By looking at the logical structure of BitTorrent, however, I 
see the relationship between the protocol's articulation of “swarm” collaboration and 
Connell and Wood's (2005) analysis of transnational business logics, and more 
specifically the ways in which certain forms of collaboration and organization become 
gendered and subsequently valued or devalued. This illustrates the assumptions innate to 
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technical objects like protocols, and links such expression to the tension of agency in 
networks more broadly. 
   As I investigated in Chapter 2, the relationship between digital labor, 
collaboration, and gender are not only a question of representation in the field of 
computer programming, but also a question of the labor itself, insomuch as techniques in 
computer programming can reflect gender relationships. Primary to this was an 
expression of the notion of the ideal, singular master of code as a discourse. Following 
this, I also argue that foregrounding criticism of code that focuses on individual pieces of 
code (like the algorithm or the interface) may implicitly reinscribe or valorize that frame 
of reference for code. Proceeding from my analysis of the performativity of code in Slash 
Goggles and transCoder, I now look at the question of the “protocol” to extend my 
analysis into the question of relational logics of labor more broadly, maintaining my 
focus on their expression digital artifacts. Protocols are not simply rules of connection or 
engagement, but blueprints for connectivity that prescribe specific styles of network 
formation. The cultural work of a protocol is a demonstration of the collaboration across 
the boundary of user and expert, which exposes the gendered histories of collaboration 
and labor. Rather than see these histories as encapsulated in a protocol, however, I argue 
that they are rather distilled or refined into concrete logics of collaboration. Thus, 
technical specifications can be read as a cultural expression of ideology much like any 
other text. 
Drawing from my arguments in the previous chapter, I further contend that 
protocological expression can and does extend beyond texts like computer code, and find 
further implications in what we would colloquially refer to as "networks." However, 
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rather than spreading that terminology to its breaking point, I will limit my discussion of 
networks to technological or communicative networks grounded in digital media. There 
are connections between the strictly technological network I discuss here and “networks” 
more broadly, but one specific difference, other than a limit of scope, is a specificity of 
application. Technological networks are defined by function and form, providing efficient 
and reliable modes of communication. They are also, as Alexander Galloway (2004) 
writes, prescriptions of structure and power that frame modes of communication (54). In 
their explicit call to the relational aspect of communicative labor, protocols more 
accurately gather hardware, software, and users within a logic that defines ways of 
collaborating that are also inflected by histories of labor and gender in digital technology. 
Or, as I suggest, protocols articulate certain rhetorical formations. I draw the term, 
“articulation” from communication and cultural studies to describe the expressive work 
of protocol. Articulation is tied to the practices of identity in technical communication in 
that meaning, communication, and mediation communication networks are better realized 
culturally as a series of communicative identities that potentially re-inscribe or resist 
dominant cultural ideologies. More specifically than that, through articulation and the 
notion of performativity, I will argue here that "articulations" of identity are present in 
hardware, software, and users through myriad computational utterances that perform 
arrangements of collaboration that have been historically valued with gender 
characteristics. 
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Figure 3.1 The TCP/IP Stack 
BitTorrent 
Despite its technological mystique, BitTorrent represents an attempt to reinterpret one of 
the most fundamental operations in digital communication: the transference of files 
between one user and the next. The goal of the protocol itself, as outlined by creator 
Bram Cohen (2001), is to improve the efficiency and reliability of file transfer for larger 
files through a collectivization of downloading and uploading resources. Cohen presented 
the specification and tested it over the next two years before developing and releasing the 
software. Protocol specifications, seen at a glance as impenetrable and iron-clad design 
documents, serve as connecting definitions of logic that specialists interpret and enact in 
hardware and software.  
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The BitTorrent specification is no different, but if we recognize its highly technical 
nature as a performative aspect of a larger technical/cultural identity, it gestures to some 
of the larger cultural assumptions. To shape the contours of this performativity, it is 
necessary that we first understand the technological context of BitTorrent as a piece of 
software and then approach how it functions at the level of critique. A discussionof the 
BitTorrent protocol provides a way to investigate the intersections of the technological, 
performative, and rhetorical dimensions of BitTorrent as a form of organization and 
critique. The simplest way to discuss a protocol in the digital sense is to discuss it in 
tandem with another concept: the network. And the simplest way to discuss a network is 
to discuss the one that we are most familiar with: The Internet. 
 
TCP/IP and the Internet 
A quick etymology of the name “Internet” demonstrates that while a network, it is more 
accurately described as a network of networks (inter-net) and, as such, a specification by 
which decentralized clusters of computers can connect into a larger, cohesive 
communication structure. The Internet does not, despite some remaining popular belief, 
itself exist as a decentralized collection of computers, phones, routers, and cables that 
have come together and emerged as some sort of cohesive structure. As Galloway writes, 
were this the case the Internet would fail as a meaningful mode of organization or 
structure (30). Nor is it a metaphor for our contemporary condition, a flattening of the 
global economy and social connectivity. Rather, the Internet is the result of a structured 
suite of rules, definitions, and operations that defines how those computers, phones, and 
routers communicate through those cables. 
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The structure of the Internet is defined by the "Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol" (TCP/IP). The first development of TCP/IP is credited to 
Robert E. Kahn and Vincent Cerf (1974) as part of the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) project on computer communication, which sought to create a 
robust and flexible network of computers for military application. Kahn, Cerf, and their 
team (in conjunction with the United States Military and several universities) sought to 
create a network that did not have to rely on a central host or controller to function, and 
maintained itself through a distributed operational model. This is likened by Galloway to 
President Eisenhower’s plan for the national highway system: a plan where travel or 
exchange can continue even if massive damage occurred to any given point or points 
(35). As such, there is no "TCP/IP server" or enabler that shapes the Internet (this is left 
to other technologies, as we will discuss later). Instead, TCP/IP constructs a self-
producing network in which nodes, or points within that network, share the responsibility 
of routing communications and keeping the network up and running. To accomplish this, 
the TCP/IP protocol was conceived as an approach by which communications would 
occur through the combined efforts of the machines on that network, and that the 
operation of the network would be independent of software used by those machines. This, 
in turn, required a clear specification of the rules by which computers would 
communicate, and a method by which different computers could utilize the same 
underlying rules. W. Richard Stevens (1994) writes that "[n]etworking protocols are 
normally developed in layers, with each layer responsible for a different facet of 
communications” (5). These “layers” are typically called the TCP/IP “stack,” represented 
in a stack diagram: 
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The "stack" is a theoretical representation of how data moves through various 
hardware and software to find its way to its intended destination, and serves as the 
extensible model of how TCP/IP works. The "application" layer is the layer we most 
readily recognize. This layer is where we interface the data, either through a program or 
through the operating system. A web browser is a good example, as a web page served 
and visible through the web browser is at the application layer. The data was meant to be 
at that layer, and interpreted by that software. The next level down, the "transport" layer, 
breaks the data into pieces, called "packets," and includes information on how many 
packets there are, the size of the data, and how it will connect to the server. The third, 
"Internet," Adds information regarding the location of the receiving computer on the 
Internet, such as the IP address, and the address of where the information came from. 
This is critical for error checking, as an error in transmission can be served to the sender. 
Finally, the "Link" layer adds a "MAC", or hardware address from the sender and 
receiver, so that the proper hardware (typically an Ethernet or wireless card) get it. 
The significance of this is that the stack represents an order that abstracts the 
reality of the actual implementing computer and, eventually, the material substrate of 
communication, at the bottom of all this data. Even the name “TCP/IP” denotes this 
reality: Internet Protocol defines the basic kinds of information passed around between 
computers (in this case, data quanta known as “packets” and strings of numbers called 
“addresses” that denote location) while TCP defines controls that render this information 
and its transmission reliable. Because of the shared simplicity of the information quanta 
and the abstract approach of the controlling mechanism, each layer, while working in 
conjunction, also defines an entirely different context through which information passes. 
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This allows programmers to develop applications (or other protocols) at different points 
in the stack without necessarily having to consider another layer (except, perhaps, to 
know how to handle data). Whether a developer uses a Mac or PC, Windows or Linux, 
Intel or AMD hardware, the implementation of the protocol allows all these computers to 
share a common mode of communication. Independently of how I am utilizing the data 
(browsing the web, transferring files), the TCP/IP stack facilitates the communication by 
abstracting network communication from the user. 
However, TCP/IP is only part of what makes the Internet the Internet. TCP/IP, by 
itself, is a radically horizontal and dispersed logic of control, and furthermore it uses 
conventions that are not necessarily helpful to users: for example, IP addresses uses to 
designate computers are complex and hard to remember, and do not provide an intuitive 
organization structure from end-to-end. This is where another part of the Internet comes 
in, and renders it in many ways intelligible to the everyday user. Dynamic Name Server 
(DNS) protocol, exerts a different kind of control that modifies how the network 
emerges. DNS defines the method of storing, distributing, and decentralizing a list of 
Universal Resource Locator (URL) names mapped to IP addresses across the Internet. So, 
for example, if the IP address for the Google main search page server is 74.125.29.99, 
then the DNS protocol specifies the way in which computers routing IP packet can 
resolve the IP address (74.125.29.99) with the URL name (google.com). DNS, unlike 
TCP/IP, is hierarchical in the way it organizes IP addresses, as the following diagram 
illustrates: 
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Figure 3.2 DNS Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The overlap of TCP/IP and DNS therefore creates a meaningful logic of communication, 
and from that emerges a network in which routing, tracing, and domain-name lookup are 
distributed throughout the nodes.   
   Rather than the hierarchical nature of DNS, or the decentralization of TCP/IP, 
the Internet operates through what Galloway calls a "contradiction of two opposing 
machines," which belies the reality that the Internet, although appearing decentralized, is 
tightly controlled (9). That is, the non-linear TCP/IP protocol works alongside the 
structure of DNS to form a robust and usable network. To look at the Internet as a 
protocol, rather than as an emergent assemblage, requires we study the protocol 
specification as a precursor to network formation. 
As Panwar, et al (2004) write, "The lowercase Internet means multiple networks 
connected, using a common protocol suite. The uppercase Internet refers to the collection 
of hosts . . . around the world that can communicate with each other using TCP/IP" (16). 
Thus TCP/ IP abstracts what Tiziana Terranova (2004) would call the "heterogeneous" 
collection of local networks, producing a system of mediation in which they all therefore 
become a larger network under the same logic of communication (140). 
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Figure 3.3 Routing Table 
The strength that comes from these two seemingly opposed logics is that they 
ground responsibility for network maintenance into a repetitive set of actions and data 
structures shared by all computers. IP packets move through the network through a 
process called “routing,” where a series of computers will receive packets from one end 
of the network and, utilizing the IP address of the sender and the receiver, “route” the 
packet to the next nearest computer for further transmission. Data is rarely, if ever, 
transmitted directly between two machines, but along a route of connecting machines that 
direct traffic where it needs to go: 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As much as we think of networks as participatory (I "get on" the Internet), 
protocols define the ways in which each user is harnessed as a propagator of that 
network. The Internet is no exception: the basic logic of TCP/IP is a robust persistence, 
an iteration across implementing machines. Each node in the TCP/IP network is a shared 
production of the protocol, and each node, although ostensibly representing a "user" (and 
this is the point where we might easily conflate a node with an actual entity, like a 
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computer or a human), is a point of the network’s production of itself. As Galloway 
writes, 
Thus, in an important way, networks are not metaphors. The network 
metaphor is misleading, limiting. It only provides a general model for 
discussing relationships. . . Understanding networks not as metaphors, but 
as materialized and materializing media, is an important step toward 
diversifying and complexifying our understanding of power relationships 
in control societies. (xv) 
 
If networks, and network protocols, are not metaphors, a pivotal rhetorical 
mechanism of the network is not necessarily the communication that moves through it, 
nor necessarily the potential that it enables for users, but its own reproduction of itself as 
an expression of relationships. 
 
BitTorrent 
Judy Wajcman (2004) argues that the gendered and technological aspects of networks are 
already social and technical, constitutive social and material realities (104). In that sense, 
the realities introduced by a network protocol, are concurrently social and technical, and 
not simply in their most socially recognizable manifestations. The specifications 
themselves, the documentation and the definitions, constitute a clear social construct that 
illustrates the interconnected work of communicative action in technology. They also 
outline the spaces in which awareness of social action, engagement with it, and 
(potentially) critique of it is merged into a single socio-technical space. We saw this very 
clearly in Chapter 2, where code and sexuality mingled into a space of discursive 
potential rooted in digital media and history. That reality continues here, writ much larger 
and spread across a wider spectrum of hardware and relationships. 
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Figure 3.4 BitTorrent 
Take the application layer of TCP/IP. At this layer, we find numerous attempts to 
facilitate new kinds of communication, to harness or create new networks "on top of" the 
TCP/IP protocol, to accomplish different tasks. One basic function that happens at this 
level (and often in conjunction with other levels) is the process of file exchange. HTTP 
and FTP, for example, are traditional file sharing protocols that we typically use or have 
used daily to exchange data in the form of web pages or documents. Traditionally, file 
sharing occurs through a straightforward client/server model, in which files are hosted on 
centralized servers. To get the file, a client computer connects to the server, downloads 
the file in its  
entirety, and disconnects. A single server, hosting a single file, would serve that 
file to as many users as connections could be maintained, but for each user, the file would 
be downloaded in its entirety from that single server. This model obviously causes 
problems when servers are overloaded by too many users, or if connection to the server is 
unreliable. 
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Figure 3.5 Traditional vs. Swarm Servers 
BitTorrent changes this by shifting peer-to-peer exchange from a client/server model to a 
decentralized client/servers model that offloads the work of transmission into a crowd of 
users. A "swarm," in this case, refers to the way multiple users, of their own volition, 
participate in a set of shared activities to distribute work and computational resources to 
accomplish some task. When downloading a file from a source (say, a web page, or an 
audio file, or streaming data from YouTube), the relationship from client to server is one-
to-one: the client connects to a single server and downloads the data. Conversely, a server 
to client relationship is one-to-many: a server can deliver the file for many concurrent 
client computers, depending on resources. This is because a file, for the purposes of 
transfer, is a single entity clearly demarcated by the file systems in question and bounded 
by meta-information that tells each computer where the file begins and ends. I download 
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a music file, and I get, from that server, that musical file. It is a single, contiguous entity. 
Under BitTorrent, however, each file is represented as a segmented file: 
 
That is, each file is divided into segments called pieces which serve as quanta for file 
transfer. An associated torrent file spells out the metadata for the file of transfer, 
including the size and number of pieces. Trackers, or programs that monitor these torrent 
files, trace the number of users with the torrent file and the original data file, and keep 
count of how many computers contain that file. Following this, when a client downloads 
the torrent file from a server, the tracker uses the file to connect that user to a swarm of 
computers sharing that file (Cohen 2003). This is significant, because instead of modeling 
a direct client/server relationship, BitTorrent models multiple client to server relations to 
Figure 3.5 Traditional vs. Swarm Servers 
71 
 
access data. On its own, this fact doesn’t really mean anything, as a computer can connect 
to servers as much as it please. But BitTorrent changes this by structuring the 
communicative relationship between computers so that each connection my computer 
makes to a server is a download for a portion of the file, rather than for an individual file. 
To maintain the robustness and efficiency of this network, each user or node on 
the network thus falls into one of two categories. First, “seeders” represent nodes that 
share a file. Under the traditional mode of file sharing, a node fulfills the "server" role 
when it makes a file available for copy over networked communication, and other 
computers download from it. Seeders are computers that serve the files, but under the 
rules of BitTorrent, each seeder is responsible for sharing only pieces of that file, rather 
than having to share the entire file (Cohen 2003). Second, “leechers” are nodes 
downloading the file pieces from other computers. A leecher, downloading a file, 
foregoes the trouble of having to download an entire file from a single server, but instead 
downloads pieces of that file from multiple seeders concurrently. This means that, 
depending on the ratio of seeders to leechers, a client could still download an entire file 
from a single source, or download multiple pieces of the file from multiple computers 
(Cohen 2003). Downloading pieces from multiple seeders dramatically (again, depending 
on the ratio of seeders to leechers) increases the speed and reliability of the download 
while decreasing computational load and connection times. A collection of seeders and 
leechers exchanging pieces of the same file is called, in BitTorrent parlance, a “swarm.” 
The protocol effectively distributes responsibility through time and space to make the 
network work, and this distribution creates the swarm of users that collect around a given 
file, each fulfilling their role. BitTorrent therefore produces informational “bodies” 
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within a network that complete a very specific and discrete task that follows a swarm 
logic (Cohen 2003). 
 
Protocol and Critique 
It is easy to see how one can get lost in the technical discussions related to software and 
lose sight of its immediate cultural impact, which is why it is often easier to see the 
cultural impact as limited to the use of technology rather than the technology itself. I 
included a selection from the BitTorrent specification above to demonstrate this, and to 
demonstrate the translation work required to begin to work through the larger 
implications of the protocol itself to see it as structurally expressive. This expressiveness 
is in fact a critique of inefficient file transfer and a rectification of that through an 
extension and rethinking of that underlying structure, which then in turn expresses a 
swarm network. The BitTorrent protocol specifically uses the same contradiction of 
collective and individual agency in TCP/IP, but mobilizes it differently to produce the 
network shape that it seeks. 
“Structurally expressive” means different things in different contexts, and through 
different technologies. One might ask what BitTorrent expresses, and in doing so we 
enter a different realm of analysis that breaks away from the notion of technology as an 
accompaniment to, or mediator of, effective rhetorical action. Brown (2016) argues that 
assumptions of ethics are “coded” into software, and upon looking at BitTorrent we 
immediately notice some of the cultural work of collaborative and networked labor 
expressed. For Brown, this invites us to think of the “possibility spaces” in code, or to 
think about how code provides a new space for rhetorical action (99). However, I do not 
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want to get too far into a strictly rhetorical discussion of the expressiveness of a given 
technological objects, in no small part because I believe that it may in fact re-inscribe the 
glorification of individual utterance or discourse mentioned earlier. For example, Byron 
Hawk (2004) articulates a vision of rhetorical theory in which common topoi like ethos, 
Heuristics, and Situation find their re-inscription in an informational communicative 
discourse (832). Likewise, Collin Brooke’s (2009) Lingua Fracta re-situates the rhetorical 
canons considering a new media culture, where comment sections, databases, and the 
Internet place each canon in a slightly-askew position, a reference to something similar 
and yet different (199). As Brooke writes, however, his study of new media and rhetoric 
is more about how communities "take up" technology, and Hawk’s theoretical approach 
likewise reconfigures existing rhetorical tropes within the taking up of complexity theory 
and digital media. Brooke specifically cites the fact that he focuses on the level of 
"practice" rather than code or culture to frame his work as a more generalized heuristic 
for thinking about rhetoric and new media (199). This practice seems to take root, 
however, less in the collective power of a given technology and more on the potential for 
persuasive action within technology (as opposed to outside or prior to it). 
As I consider code as performative of historical norms of labor, I do so with the 
understanding that code and protocols are in fact utterances with ramifications for further 
action. That is, performative technology is something that is done rather than something 
that is external to the doing. BitTorrent, for example, is in some sense a constraint upon 
communication. But a performative understanding of it as an act sees the critical capacity 
therein to resist, subvert, or comment upon other performative technologies. BitTorrent 
harnesses the “doing” of TCP/IP and DNS (the structuring of relationships in a public 
74 
 
network) to do something else, something that extends from the protocol that came before 
it. I therefore resist then the urge to make technology a discussion of place, of where 
discourse happens or where speakers and writers make persuasive texts. Robert Kitchen 
and Martin Dodge (2011) frame the studies of code and network as one of space, arguing 
that code or network space is produced by the production of assembled actants that 
"emerge as self-organizing systems of relations stretched out across space and time” (77). 
Case in point, many approaches do not necessarily address what Donna Haraway (1991) 
refers to as the "control strategies" that exist in the technological societies of today. She 
writes that “one should expect control strategies to focus on boundary conditions and 
interfaces, on rates of flow across boundaries . . . No objects, spaces or boundaries are 
sacred in themselves; any component can be interfaced with any other if the proper 
standard, the proper code, can be constructed for processing signals in common language 
(302).  
Boundary conditions, unlike spatial boundaries, are the meeting points of 
practices and control, of a self and the production of that self, in informational society. 
More specifically, these interfaces are the strategies of controlling disparate, 
heterogeneous entities through the re-production of those entities within an informational 
context. So, computers developed across different manufacturers with different 
specifications are recreated as homogeneous nodes through a series of regulations and 
specifications. The exercise of any agency is then already linked through this 
reproduction, with the performative work of coding structuring the exercise of agency in 
a tension between individual activity and collective necessity (302). Women and 
reproduction, Haraway argues, are (re)figured in discourses of technoscience as problems 
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of population control and "maximization of goal achievement for individual decision-
makers” (302).   
   It is precisely the seemingly reasonable and accepted relationship between 
technology and culture exemplified in "network culture" that makes control strategies not 
only possible and potent, but normalized into previous frameworks of inquiry like 
rhetoric. Terranova defines network culture as an informational milieu in which the 
characteristics of data, communication, and non-linearity shape social-technological 
formations. Concepts like social networking and the citizen-content producer were still in 
their infancy near the beginning of what is now commonly referred to as the "Web 2.0" of 
wikis and web applications that we are familiar with today. But her arguments regarding 
the nature of information, the Internet, and "free labor" resonate perhaps even more 
strongly now than ten years ago, primarily because the consequences outlined in Network 
Cultures are only amplified through contemporary, participatory social media. When she 
argues that "the relation between the Internet and the production of space is . . . crucial to 
all theoretical engagements with Internet culture," it is important to understand that she 
does so to note that "this informational and electronic space, as it is constituted within 
this single map, appears as uncannily reminiscent of a modern dream for a completely 
homogeneous and controllable space” (44). 
This seems counterintuitive: what could be more heterogeneous than the Internet? 
And yet even in the discussions of TCP/IP and BitTorrent we can see some of the truth of 
this, and further see the way in which these protocols express homogeneity. In 
"Articulation: A Working Paper on Rhetoric and Taxis,” Nathan Stormer (2004) argues 
towards a rethinking of rhetorical history and theory as one "that does not require 
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principle focus on a humanistic subject, centered or decentered” (258). For Stormer, this 
understanding places the study of rhetoric as the study of practices, and the study of 
practices as the study of relationships between entities rather than the entities themselves. 
Unlike Brooke's claim to study practices, Stormer argues that studying practices is the 
study of relationships and order itself, and how order expresses particular rhetorics. He 
writes that "as opposed to analyzing the rhetoric of individuals, analyzing the rhetoric of 
practices means one does not necessarily start from a given point nor end in each place. 
One may start with a space, an image, a canonized activity, or a network of relationships, 
and study their importance to the formation of the culture” (259). Karen Barad's (2008) 
theory of material performativity resonates with this understanding of rhetoric as 
emergent. She writes that "discourse is not what is said; it is that which constrains and 
enables what can be said,” and clearly ties constraint to material conditions outside of 
human language (261). For Barad, the performativity of discourse is found in the 
dynamic interaction of the world, and calls for prioritizing relations over pre-existing 
objects entering in to relation. She argues that the limits of Butler’s theory of 
performativity is that it does not account for the performative materiality of bodies 
themselves, and in conjunction with Stormer I would use the term “body” as a reference 
not only to human bodies but to rhetorical or informational bodies, bodies rendered by 
technology and code. 
Articulation in this technological sense is the activity of performative technology 
as it expresses particular cultural ideologies through media. Obviously, the term also has 
an established history in cultural studies, but has also made its way into scholarship in 
technical communication. Slack, et al (2006) draw from Alan Grossberg and Antonio 
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Gramsci to integrate articulation as a concept into technical communication. To 
understand articulation is to understand that “any identity in a social formation must be 
understood as a non-necessary connection between the elements that constitute it” (37). It 
is not much of a stretch to then understand network identity as something constituted by 
the protocols and relationships within that network, and to then look to those protocols 
and relationships as significant rhetorical aspects of that network. To follow this line of 
reasoning also means that the continuum of user-technology-expert is only a particular 
formation of power that designates a spatial and temporal framework to understand 
experts as creators of networks, users as inhabitants of networks, and technology as 
metaphorical or literal spaces, sites, or locations. With each separation, with each dash, 
we immediately render the distinction between each clear, and in particular allow 
analysis to exclude specifics of cultural ideology from seemingly non-cultural aspects 
(that is, technology). 
BitTorrent, perhaps surprisingly, demonstrates the relationship of control and 
articulation to digital media, and immediately problematizes the separation of an agent or 
actor in a network and the technology that constitutes that network. Leechers and seeders 
are not simply labels placed upon users as they participate in the technology: they are 
conditions of the technology and its performative utterance. The designation of actors as 
collaborative aspects of the network articulates a worldview of collaboration that values 
distinct separation of duties, normalized relationships that inform a larger goal. Nodes—
seeders and leeches—are further articulations of the protocol, and the protocol itself is re-
articulated through use, error checking, and testing. Likewise, the tension of individual 
agency and the construction of agency for collective purposes highlights the critical 
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importance of recognizing the ways in which these ideologies permeate technology. 
Brown rightfully argues that networked environments "make it difficult to hold situated 
[socially produced or oriented] ethos and invented [constructed] ethos," as distinct 
practices, but limits his discussion of how ideological categories such as race, gender, and 
class play a part in either in these environments (Brown 113-114). 
BitTorrent becomes problematic when it is theorized as prior to or differentiated 
from 
ideologies of power, or when it is used to discuss rhetorical concepts like invention, 
distribution, or circulation outside of such ideologies. Brooke writes that "I do not 
question that factors such as gender, race, and class have profound effects on technology, 
but I would dispute the notion that technology studies should be reduced to an 
exploration of those factors to the exclusion of all else” (Brooke 13). I don’t believe that 
his point here is to disparage gender studies, but rather to argue that there is a 
technological discussion of rhetoric outside of them. The interesting use of the word 
"reduction," however, suggests technology as differentiated or more primary to the study 
of gender (or perhaps even any other social category), a notion that I reject. As Theresa 
de Lauretis (1987) writes, “the movement in and out of gender as ideological 
representation . . . is a movement back and forth between the representation of gender (in 
its male-centered frame of reference) and what that representation leaves out, or, more 
pointedly, makes unrepresentable” (26). Technology is often the space where gender is 
made unrepresentable, and too much emphasis on the “language” of technology 
marginalizes the clear cultural affect of that technology. 
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BitTorrent, as an expressive discourse, is a sort of apparatus that produces 
informational bodies. BitTorrent produces these bodies through the performative nature 
of digital media: the epistemological underpinning of TCP/IP extends through BitTorrent 
as it multiplies the server-client model to produce a swarm, a force that disassembles and 
solves a problem. In the BitTorrent network, the "nodes" are leechers or seeders, but 
more accurately they are composites of file transference. That is, each node in the 
network is ostensibly, within the parameters of participation, an agent of the swarm or the 
shared responsibility of file transfer. They hold pieces of files and allow access to them, 
while they also download other files. Thus, the central tenet of BitTorrent is that the more 
participants engage within the process of sharing or swarming, the more stable and 
productive the network is. And, the more effective its tactics are: many a message board 
has bemoaned the abuse of the system by "leechers" who refuse to seed (participate). 
Contradictory logics in protocols have been referred to as "ironic" specifically to point 
out how seemingly these contradictory elements, rather than functioning in a 
deconstructive framework, instead articulate the discrepancy between network protocol 
as models and networks as performative entities. TCP/IP functions through the enactment 
of a hierarchical and a decentralized juxtaposition, a mode that allows it to distribute an 
agential network in which all computers can feasibly run as servers or clients. Likewise, 
BitTorrent, in building off TCP/IP, draws from that performativity to articulate a swarm 
network, adopting and multiplying the server-client relationship. This expression of 
multiplication results in the swarm. BitTorrent uses the term "swarm" to refer to the work 
done, continuously, to share and maintain the sharing of a file (Cohen). Inspired by 
Haraway’s Cyborg, Sarah Kember (2003) argues that Haraway’s study of 
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biotechnological kinships are not "purely epistemological,” but they are a “response to 
different modes of being emerging from the mutually inflected fields of biotechnology, 
feminism, and science studies” (187). This conversation points to what Barad calls the 
"agential cut,” where the logic of relationships define agents, rather than the other way 
around (Barad 144). There is no direct distinction of technology, biology, or language 
prior to such cuts, but instead the production of bodies through material-discursive 
practices. BitTorrent is an enactment of and formation for swarm logics, and participates 
in the production of the informational bodies necessary to produce agency. However, the 
“cut” of BitTorrent emerges not from a space of equanimity or horizontal organization, 
but (like other protocols such as the TCP/ IP protocol that it builds upon) a goal-driven 
and hierarchical logic that, in turn, articulates a seemingly decentralized plane of shared 
labor towards a common goal: the potential for communication and participation. The 
swarm logic of a protocol like BitTorrent does not, despite claims to the contrary, 
produce an emergent whole from disparate parts, but rather a controlled collapse of 
individual and collective agency under the ironic juxtaposition of control logics in 
technology. 
 
The Periperformativity of Protocological Critique 
If BitTorrent as a network articulates informational bodies from its specification, then it 
is structurally expressive. It is also, in its own way, a critique of the underlying file-
sharing technology that came before it. Countering the inefficiency of the client-server 
model, BitTorrent enacts its critique by articulating new forms of collaboration. The 
nodes come after the logic of these forms, and the information that passes between nodes 
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is not the product of pre-existing agents, but a performative utterance of a network 
articulating itself. If abstraction has its roots as a historically gendered technique of 
collaboration, then abstraction as a practice also allows different historically gendered 
techniques to emerge as consequences of actions undertaken through software. BitTorrent 
distributed computer power to share files, but swarms in other contexts distribute labor 
that has traditionally been gendered in the technological world (writing, transcription, 
data entry) and hearkens back to a history in which gender and sexuality functioned as 
delimiters for acceptable work while at the same time constructing a system of invisible 
work. 
Since BitTorrent is an articulation of agents within a collaborative network, a 
rhetorical understanding of that articulation should engage the politics of that 
collaboration. As Karen Lunsford and Lisa Ede (1990) argue, there are multiple modes of 
collaboration or participation, all of which can accomplish some goal for some reason. 
Some differentiate a "dialogic" mode of collaboration with a "hierarchical" mode. The 
hierarchical mode is driven by strictly delineated tasks accomplished by individuals in 
clearly assigned roles (235). This linear mode of collaboration values the individual as 
part of a greater whole, with the greater whole structured as a clearly defined task or goal. 
This form of collaboration is less interested in a multitude of perspectives, and as such it 
often seeks to conform them into a single goal or purpose to smooth out the collaborative 
process. Lunsford and Ede argue that this mode of collaboration is typically conservative 
and historically inscribed as masculine, and often sees collaborative or participatory work 
as a problem to be solved (235). These definitions are not universal, but remain reliant on 
different kinds of institutional or cultural labor. Connell and Wood (2005) write that 
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patterns of management (patterns that structure worker relations for subordinates, among 
other things) often demonstrate forms of hegemonic masculinities that reflect changing 
modes of collaboration (349). They write that masculinity in global business contexts 
often reflect progressive attitudes towards gender equity while at the same time 
reiterating highly stressful and limiting gender traits seen as necessary for business 
people: namely the exercise of power in institutional relationships and recognition of 
provisionality as part of that power (360). The separation of progressive representation of 
gender equality from gendered labor practices allows for the rise of business 
masculinities that value competition, power, hierarchy, and provisional social 
relationships. 
Such a separation is evident in many professional programming communities, 
perhaps magnified through their fluid nature and overt focus on technological production. 
Linus Torvalds, the creator of the Linux operating system, has often equated masculinity 
with technical work like programming, often connecting complex, mathematical tasks 
and design to the work of “men.” And while there is often a strain of gender 
discrimination in programming more broadly, much more significant is the ways in 
which increased calls for progressive reform in programming culture continue apace with 
the very same styles of collaboration that mimic hegemonic business masculinities. Linux 
is grounded in the notion of global, provisional labor, where power is modeled through 
meritocracy, and where competition (good code) is seen as the ultimate success and proof 
of value. The styles of collaboration, which seem to foreground collective work and 
communication, do so through goal-driven and provisional models of participation that 
83 
 
do not necessarily value concrete relationships outside of professional or success-oriented 
models. 
In bringing up the question of collaboration, I hope to tie together the threads of 
this inquiry into a more coherent example of performative utterance in the form of the 
protocol, and to emphasize how types of protocological utterances affect network 
formations and, in a sense, further articulations. Network protocols map out the relational 
structure of a network, and as such they further articulate that network through key 
values. This is significant for both rhetoric and studies of gender in that the power to 
define relationships not only structures rhetoric or rhetorical possibility, but also the very 
conditions of agency in communication technologies. Stormer writes that "for me, 
articulation is not about collapsing the distinction between materiality and meaning to 
advance a specific critical project; it is about historicizing different configurations of 
materiality and meaning . . . as conditions for the coming into being of a given form of 
rhetoric” (261). Thus protocols “articulate” network cultures by expressing a rhetoric of 
relationality, and we can highlight different values across different context. In Chapter 2, 
I focused on abstraction, and how its historical roots expressed an approach to 
programming that has been historically gendered and promoted as such. Here, the focus 
on file sharing introduces a focus on values of individual and collective agency: 
BitTorrent manipulates and builds upon a performative framework of collective action. 
But to expand this analysis I also want to incorporate the ways in which identifiable 
values in these structures articulate in other digital contexts, and to think about how these 
shared values produce a larger communicative context. 
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Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick (2002) outlines a notion of the “periperformative.” The 
periperformative is an addition to the concept of the performative, in that it recognizes 
the performative as an act that calls upon (or is called upon) by norms in each situation, 
but also recognizes the social “nearness” of the aspects of the performative that can affect 
(or be affected) by it. An utterance such as “I Do” is not simply a performative in its re-
instantiation of the context and norms of legal marriage, but also a call upon those who 
witness the utterance, who are interpellated by the performative nature of that utterance 
(70). In the marriage example, the call of “I do” is a subjectivizing act not only for those 
involved but for those in witness, a call to acquiesce (or not) to the norms of the 
utterance. She argues that the performative utterance “invokes the presumption, but only 
the presumption, of a consensus between speaker and witness, and to some extent 
between all of them [the audience] and the addressee” (69). That is, a performative act 
calls not only upon the addressed but also those who would witness the act, and in turn 
spins of multiple potential responses and reactions that not necessarily intended by the 
original speaker. 
The articulation of networks by protocols is not a linear progression of norms 
from context to context, from technology to technology, but the creation and reiteration 
of periperformative responses within structured frameworks of agency. Their rhetorical 
strength lies in their ability then to articulate not only their values, but their efficiency or 
correctness. BitTorrent, as my main example here, relies on perhaps one of the most 
powerful discourses in technology: of increased speed and flexibility, of efficiency and 
correctness. However, the notion of “swarming” is a socially constructed form of 
participation and collaboration with gendered histories of labor invokes values of 
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collaborative labor articulate different forms of power tied to business-oriented 
masculinity, even as it also functions within discourses of social progressiveness. 
One example of how a swarm collaborative logic is put into practice is through 
Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Mechanical Turk is a service provided my Amazon, a sort of 
employment market for online labor. However, unlike other freelancing sites that exist to 
link potential employers with contract employees in the areas of technical or professional 
writing or programming, Mechanical Turk provides services for companies that need 
"human intelligence” (Amazon Turk FAQ). "Human Intelligence" is nominally a 
reference to the application of human thought to tasks that cannot be accomplished my 
machines. For example, typical jobs on Mechanical Turk involve transcription, survey 
completion, short essay writing, and transcription of words from images. The draw of 
Turk for employers is that, due to the nature of these tasks being unspecialized and 
(supposedly) quick to complete, they can offer wages between 5 cents or five dollars, 
depending on the job. The idea is that a worker, called a "Turker," can complete a Human 
Intelligence Task (HIT) within seconds or minutes, make money, and do so from home. 
Turkers initially sign up for an account and search through a list of jobs posted by hiring 
agencies using the service. Some of these jobs are for student research projects, some of 
these are from larger companies, some of these are from content providers online. All are 
looking for an inexpensive way to have individuals complete small, inconsequential 
tasks. This hearkens to a perhaps-misplaced notion of the modern labor economy as one 
of freelancing and freedom, where people can work on their own schedule on tasks that 
they wish to complete. Interviews and studies by individuals show that in reality, working 
through this micro-labor economy, while advertising itself as a release from money 
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concerns for those with free time, is a race to the bottom of the barrel in terms of tasks, 
wages, and time. 
Ellen Cushing (2013), interviewing Turkers, found out that it takes roughly 2000 
completed tasks to make roughly $150-$200 (Cushing). Employers can reject a Turker’s 
work without explanation, costing the work time, money, and reputation (a staple for the 
service, as workers with low reps find themselves unable to apply for higher-paying 
jobs). The primary tasks (up to 40%) of the jobs are also promoting spam and SEO 
content as quickly as possible, asking workers to quickly visit sites and post responses or 
write 200-500 word paragraphs heavy in Google-friendly keywords (Cushing). 
The problem here is twofold: first, the wages offered for each job are typically not 
commensurate to the time and effort needed to complete them. Second, wage calculations 
typically do not include the time it takes to search for jobs and, in some cases, the time 
needed to gain "Master Qualification" in a given task to find other, higher paying jobs. 
The freedom to work as one wishes is framed within a network of ultimately disposable 
labor, as Turkers are paid pennies on the dollar to accomplish tasks that would have 
normally required actual, hired workers. The swarm model of the jobs, in that each is 
"inconsequential" or divisible from a greater whole, shapes the ways in which workers 
are viewed: they also become inconsequential and divisible. How Amazon Turk reflects 
an engagement with the technology is interesting, because the performative discourse of 
the distributed network is also the discourse of distributed work. Turk uses swarm 
modeling to articulate labor precarity across a distributed layer network. As Moshe Z. 
Marvit (2014) writes, if you happen to be a low-end worker doing the Internet’s grunt 
work, a different vision arises (Marvit). According to critics, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
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may have created the most unregulated labor marketplace that has ever existed. Inside the 
machine, there is an over-abundance of labor, extreme competition among workers, 
monotonous and repetitive work, exceedingly low pay and a great deal of scamming. In 
this virtual world, the disparities of power in employment relationships are magnified 
many times over, and the New Deal may as well have never happened (Marvit). 
However, in some cases, the logic of swarms is situated under the friendlier aegis 
of "crowdsourcing." Aniket Kittur (2010) writes that "Crowdsourcing has worked 
especially well for certain kinds of tasks, typically, ones that are fast to complete, incur 
low cognitive load, have low barriers to entry, are objective and verifiable, require little 
expertise, and can be broken up into independent subtasks” (22). Crowdsourcing, like 
swarms, is the method of approaching complex tasks as smaller sets of subtasks, with a 
group of individuals working together to accomplish those subtasks to finish the larger 
one. Such an approach (specifically under the term "crowdsourcing," and not swarming) 
are prevalent in areas such as science and independent project funding. In many cases, 
crowdsourcing has been argued to benefit to projects in which data itself becomes a 
problem. One such example is HarassMap. HarassMap is a crowd sources locations 
where women in the Middle East are regularly harassed by men. If they experience some 
sort of physical or verbal harassment, women can go online and update the map by 
reporting the harassment. The website uses a map interface, with color-coding that allows 
users to specify the type of harassment they went through. It also tracks the frequency of 
harassment in certain areas, while allowing the women to remain as anonymous as 
possible. This sort of crowdsourcing picks up an endemic problem and addresses the 
distributed nature of that problem: that harassment occurs repeatedly, and often without 
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repercussions. Furthermore, this model mobilizes the Internet by allowing women to 
report this harassment on a map that helps them navigate areas in which harassment may 
be prevalent. Since a single creator or committee of creators could not manage handling 
all the incoming reports themselves, nor could they be expected to get information on 
those reports from police or other authorities (who would probably not share it, share it 
piecemeal, or never report it to begin with). The crowdsourcing alleviates these issues by 
distributing the reporting of harassment across the women who are harassed. 
Participation, in this way, leverages a crowdsourced approach to alleviate responsibility 
and accountability away from reporting women. The creators of HarassMap describe the 
project as a way to "engage all of Egyptian society to create an environment that does not 
tolerate sexual harassment” (“Who We Are”). 
Through HarassMap, women participate by sharing data about sexual harassment 
incidents throughout Egypt. Women anonymously submit incidents, which are then 
coded into a digital map that viewers can see online. Each incident is marked on the map 
with the time, date, and kind of incident (catcalling, photography, sexual advances). 
Women who report these incidents are also given a response that indicates places where 
they can find counseling and legal services in cases of sexual harassment. Since sexual 
harassment is so wide spread, the map helps to spatialize it: looking at the map, women 
can see "hot spots" of harassing activities, and relatively safe zones where less or no 
reports are emerging. Furthermore, it allows women to report such incidents outside of a 
legal framework and make the knowledge public. As there are often no legal resources 
for sexual harassment, this service provides another outlet for information to disseminate. 
This form of crowdsourcing is like the swarm, in that the role of "reporter" is abstracted 
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from the body of the harassed woman. The agential position of "reporter" is thus enacted 
in ways that it could not be outside of the logic of crowdsourcing. Since the service is 
anonymous, women can more freely report such activity. Chelsea Young (2014) writes 
that "women can share their experiences anonymously, free from the social stigma and 
accusations of blame . . . the crowdsourcing model also allows women to bypass 
institutional constraints within formal law enforcement channels that may prevent them 
from reporting incidents of sexual harassment” (8). This is incredibly effective and 
powerful, as the onus to complete the task of reporting and identifying trouble areas is 
placed on the method of sharing itself, rather than the individuals involved, and the 
designation of "reporter" as an agent position allows women to perform the network: by 
reporting. 
This seems counter-intuitive, but if we think of computer protocols, as they 
articulate, as performing some sort of expressed communicative power, we can see that 
even a distributed network of women reporting harassment can be more linear than 
hierarchical, depending on the vantage point. But the hierarchical definition of 
responsibility leveraged by HarassMap is what articulates the network of possibility for 
women to have this kind of agency. And, therefore, we can look at networks like 
performances of agential possibility, with the norms associated with what constitutes 
agency already built into the system. Moving back to BitTorrent, we can see a still-linear 
mode of agency: the users are given a model of participation and follow it. But what is 
the significance of this modeling? 
 
Conclusion 
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BitTorrent, as a labor practice, models some basic assumptions about work and 
participation. Thinking of a network or protocol as a rhetorical agency means framing the 
abstracting practices within a larger spectrum of activity, one not entirely focused on the 
rhetorical, autonomous subject of the classroom, of speech, or of writing. The text of the 
protocol, its specification, is not the primary mode of the protocol in manifesting through 
networked communication. This is crucial to a rhetorical understanding of a network, 
because "purpose" here fits into a larger discussion of control and culture. As Galloway 
writes, algorithms and protocols are first and foremost about control: we do not live in a 
world of decentralization, we do not live in a world that lacks center or form. Form does 
not come into play simply through our direct intervention, but as a historical progression 
of meaning and practice through time. Thus BitTorrent, as a technology that simply "gets 
the job done" collapses into an understanding of swarm logics writ large across different 
network models. Amazon Turk and HarassMap are examples of swarms, expressions of a 
logic that we see operationalized in BitTorrent. BitTorrent, perhaps more concretely and 
abstractly than either example, articulates the swarm through distributed labor.   
   This multiplication of individuation produces a swarm of informational bodies 
performing a given labor. BitTorrent situates itself with nothing but a drive to solve a 
problem: the problem of sharing files. But extrapolating this logic to other problems, like 
cheap labor and reporting sexual harassment, illustrates how particular forms of labor, 
forms that have been historically masculinized in corporate settings, can still exist in 
seemingly horizontal collaborative structures. 
It seems then that what a given goal is plays part in the expressiveness of the 
network itself, and implicates what might be a rhetorical "audience" and a responsibility 
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to that audience. As Christian Lundberg and Joshua Gunn (2005) write that "instead of 
avoiding responsibility, a relentless questioning of the conditions of the production of the 
agent, and a close textual engagement with the agential narrative and the agent’s texts 
affirms an unconditional commitment to responding, and ultimately to responsibility, 
despite our corporate attempts to credit the rhetoric community with good conscience” 
(96). The production of the agent is central to the question of articulation, and stems 
directly from the expression of gendered labor in programming. A rhetorical question, 
suggesting an “agent” invite numerous contentious takes on the importance of theorizing 
(or resisting) an origin to rhetorical agency. But it also invites questions to how agency 
functions as a product, rather than a source of production, of something like digital 
communication. BitTorrent articulates various agent positions that express particular and 
complex forms of agency, forms of collaboration that fit into socially and professionally 
gendered patterns of power and labor.  
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Chapter 4: 
Trust, Gendered Labor, and Persuasive Network Logics 
 
Introduction 
It was only four years after the first major implementation of Bitcoin, in November of 
2013, when a single bitcoin traded for a peak value of approximately $1,200USD, a 
historical high for the new and volatile currency that had fluctuated in value from that 
peak to a single cent (Watts 2013). As free money activists, libertarian investors, and 
specialists in privacy and cryptography flocked to the currency, its viability competed 
with, and often was superseded by, its value as a political and technological commodity. 
Specified in a technical white paper published by developer and semi-anonymous online 
user “Satoshi Nakamoto” in 2008, Bitcoin reached its peak exchange value within the 
context of increasing interest in alternatives to government fiat currency and investment, 
fueled in part by depression and crushing austerity measures in several European 
countries. For many, Bitcoin became both a financial enterprise and a political statement 
supporting the accumulation of massive wealth without government interference. Bitcoin 
requires no governing institution, which for many provided proved the legitimacy of non-
governmental moneys and demonstrated how any problem could be solved or 
circumvented through the distributed, collective knowledge of the Internet. Bitcoin, one 
of the first implemented and functional cryptocurrencies in existence, enabled what its 
creators and users claimed was a free, anonymous, cash alternative for online purchasing. 
Using a series of  conversations of finance, but of privacy circles, European politics 
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(following heavy austerity measures in EU countries like Greece), and small-government 
libertarian advocacy (Hern, 2015). Bitcoin’s emergence as an increasingly “legitimate” 
form of money has fueled Bitcoin speculation and technological implementation, but this 
emergence is predicated on its simultaneous functioning as a digital currency and 
communications network. 
The discourses of government currency, libertarian politics, and political 
advocacy arise from a larger set of concerns in which Bitcoin, as a technological artifact, 
functions as critique. To respond to the limitations of online purchasing, the creators of 
Bitcoin essentially had to create an entire currency, one not predicated on government 
regulation or banks. But to define this currency, a currency not anchored to an issuing 
government institution, they created a series of standards known as the Bitcoin protocol 
that defines what bitcoins are, how they are traded, what kind of security measures 
protect privacy when they are traded, and how theft and fraud can be prevented while 
maintaining such privacy and security. The result is a vast network of software, traders, 
and exchanges that circulate bitcoins anywhere and everywhere in the world. The Bitcoin 
network, however, is not an amalgamation of users strung together by their shared use of 
an exchange tool, but neither is it simply a network of rational individuals engaging one 
another through the economics of technological commerce. The network is, in many 
ways, its protocol, and this protocol structures the Bitcoin network while engaging in a 
critical discourse with the structural limitations of networked communication, specifically 
the protocols that govern Internet connectivity. 
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As argued in chapter 3, protocological critique as a practice exemplifies discourse 
that collapses and mobilizes esoteric technology and culture, and Bitcoin is no different. 
But in building the case for a rhetorical method that describes technological objects like 
code as having cultural and persuasive mechanisms, I now turn to a discussion of how 
this mechanism connects implicit ideology with larger, more explicit sociopolitical 
formations. As Bitcoin is overtly a product of a conservative libertarian politic, it stands 
to reason that a further investigation of the workings of Bitcoin would illuminate the 
ways in which that politic permeates and is reiterated through the technology itself. This 
is particularly apparent when it comes to issues of gender in Bitcoin. This topic comes 
with some controversy, and not least because the question of gender participation in 
Bitcoin is divisive, with different individuals and groups providing different perspectives 
on gender representation in Bitcoin development. In 2014, Popular Science wrote that 
although the population of Bitcoin users are incredibly diverse in terms of religion, 
nationality, and background, they were overwhelmingly (95%) male (Popular Science). 
Citing a study by Lui Smyth, the magazine notes that women in Bitcoin often join for the 
same reasons (individuality, financial opportunity). Smyth notes, however, that the 
absence of women in Bitcoin is “essentially a nexus of the tech gender gap, the finance 
gender gap, and the libertarian gender gap” (Popular Science). Arguments to the contrary 
often offer anecdotal or friendly reminders that not only are women present in the Bitcoin 
world, but that being a woman in the Bitcoin world is a place where gender is part of a 
professional identity. Fortune Magazine (2015) notes that there are numerous women 
involved with the technology, albeit more prominently on the business and investment 
95 
 
side, and they are still in the vast minority of users—and even more so on the production 
side. 
There are a few reasonable arguments for this discrepancy, and I want to focus on 
one of particular interest: the historically masculinized world of anarchist or libertarian 
politics and its connection to digital technology mentioned by Smythe. While some argue 
that social norms funnel men into STEM fields and women into more domestic or care-
giving roles, others argue that there are perhaps more fundamental issues affecting how 
socially constructed gender impacts participation in Bitcoin. As Brett Scott (2014) wrote 
in a blog post reflecting on his experience at a major Bitcoin conference, some of his 
friends/fellow Bitcoin users suggest that women are “repelled . . . by the large number of 
libertarian/anarcho-capitalists in the scene, and the increasingly aggressive culture that 
surrounds it” (Scott). What he refers to is a strain of libertarian politics that has been a 
part of software development for decades, tracing back to movements stemming from 
Free Software development that embrace capitalist models of software melded into an 
odd mix of open source, crowd-sourced, and corporate structures. Scott writes that the 
political framework that surrounds Bitcoin often turns to a “libertarian ethos,” one that 
has “the side-effect of attracting those who already feel empowered (or who feel entitled 
to power)” (Scott). For Scott, this politic is an aggressive display of financial brutalism, a 
“screw the weak callousness” that fits into a capitalist and patriarchal system. 
It is this connection that I intend to trace here. If Bitcoin functions as a 
protocological critique, then it stands to reason that the connection between the protocol 
and its politics is in the rhetorical impact of its articulation of gendered, masculinized 
politics. The irony of the protocol is more fully manifest in its desire for freedom, and the 
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ways in which its culture (that it generates and is generated from) limits the practice of 
that freedom in non-institutional ways. I analyze the connections of gendered politics and 
technologies in Bitcoin to argue that one begets the other, and that the development of 
political technology such as Bitcoin invites a rhetorical critique of that technology that 
fundamentally includes gender as a constituent and necessary aspect of that development. 
 
Bitcoin and Logics of Circulation 
Before Bitcoin, digital financial transactions could only work through intermediaries such 
as banks or creditors who guarantee those transactions. Credit and banking institutions 
verify that funds are available and that buyers and sellers are legitimate before facilitating 
the transfer of money. Therefore online vendors such as Amazon require credit card or 
bank account information to process payments, rather than cash or money order. Since 
banks and creditors mediate financial transactions, they offer safety, security, and 
reliability that removes the uncertainty of shopping online because they stand in as a 
mechanism of trust. Trust is, in these contexts, institutionalized in the mediating work of 
these institutions through the structuring of identification, verification, and exchange. In 
studying Bitcoin, I illustrate how Bitcoin’s invention situates it at the intersection of trust 
in a financial sense and trust in a computer science sense. The former involves how 
identification, verification, and exchange are all aspects of financial trust, while the latter 
links financial trust to its translation and implementation within Bitcoin. The connection 
between these methods of trust will help frame a rhetorical analysis of the Bitcoin 
protocol. 
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During conventional online transactions, the identity of a purchaser is confirmed 
via credit card or banking information, funding is verified via the financial institution, 
and exchange occurs at the behest of the purchaser through the institution. Along with 
this, several further checks come into play: purchases can be traced (by both by date and 
location) and, in cases of fraud, contested. Trust, in this sense, is vested within the 
institutional capacity to keep records of (and verify) buyer and seller identities, to verify 
the existence of money or credit to complete the transaction, and to implement the 
exchange of this money between the buyer and seller. There are a number of ways that 
banks do this, usually through credit card or account numbers linked to verification 
numbers and banking identities (typically tied to a user through a social security number 
and physical address). As cybercrime and threats of international terrorism have 
increased, banks have strengthened their security measures to include secondary PIN 
numbers and security questions. Subsequently, online marketplaces have implemented 
point-to-point encryption standards as part of their online purchasing platforms. The 
communication of account verification information is heavily protected both at the point 
of purchase (during the act of transmission) or for further purchases (typically when a 
customer is a regular user and shares banking information with the company for repeated 
use). 
Bitcoin, however, replaces the required trust of third-party institutions with a 
system of mathematical checks and public regulation, and does so through its 
implementation of distributed control and security protocols. To begin, a bitcoin is not a 
“coin” in the sense that there is a minted physical object of exchange. “Bitcoin,” instead, 
is an abstraction of a chain of authorized, encrypted transactions between different parties 
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that serve as a record of that coin’s history, which verifies that the coin belongs to a 
specific person at a specific time (Nakamoto 2008, 3). So, if I have a coin, what I really 
have is the legitimate record of all transactions leading up to me that verify that I indeed 
own the coin, with my receipt of the coin ending that chain (until I trade it). I hold and 
exchange that bitcoin through a piece of software called a “wallet,” which identifies me 
as a node in the Bitcoin network, an alphanumeric string of characters called an 
“address.” Each address is unique to a wallet, not a computer, and requires no personal 
information to use.3 However, the address is used in the identification process. During 
each transaction, the Bitcoin wallet software encrypts data from the transaction through a 
method known as Public Key Encryption. What PKE does is utilize some esoteric aspects 
of prime numbers to create pairs of related keys for each user: a public and private key. 
When I send bitcoins to another user, I encrypt this data using my private key that no one 
else has access to. The only way that the user can decrypt this information (and get their 
bitcoins) is to use my public key, which is available to everyone. If the user decrypts 
information sent by me with my public key, this means that (unless my private key is 
compromised) the information was sent by me. Furthermore, each transaction also 
includes, via PKE, a digital signature tied to information within the transaction that can 
only be verified with my public key (2). 
                                                     
3 As a comparison, imagine a merger between a physical wallet and a bank account: you can 
take the wallet with you (on a USB stick or something else) and use it anywhere, but it has 
enough information to connect to the financial network to send and receive money. So long as 
the owner of the wallet does not overtly or implicitly identify himself or herself, the only 
public record of the user is the wallet address. This means that I could use my wallet to trade 
bitcoins at a home computer (which would make them traceable to me personally), or on an 
encrypted network, VPN, or some random Internet cafe (which would make it more difficult to 
trace to me).
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The wallet, upon installation on a computer or external storage device, syncs with 
the public Bitcoin ledger, which verifies all the coins currently in the network. The 
ledger, called the “blockchain,” contains all the dated and verified transactions that have 
occurred over the lifetime of the Bitcoin network, and identifies which bitcoins belong to 
what wallet address. The verification of funds for each user is therefore vested within the 
blockchain, which exists as a distributed record of information stored by every 
node/wallet in the network (2). But the maintenance of the blockchain, rather than the 
responsibility of an institution, is distributed through the network by way of bitcoin 
“mining.” A miner is a user on the network, but one that      donates CPU time from their 
computer to help solve the complex equations Bitcoin uses to protect transactions. Since 
Bitcoin exchange happens in real time, what miners do is, through their own computers, 
solve what the Bitcoin protocol calls the “proof of work” concept to verify transactions 
and update the blockchain. Avoiding the complexities of this proof of work concept, what 
ends up happening involves a race between miners to verify transactions: once a miner 
completes the proof of work necessary to verify a transaction, and if that transaction 
works with the current blockchain (that is, that the blockchain has not already been 
updated with the same or conflicting information), the transaction is placed in the 
blockchain ledger and the transaction is now verified (4). To incentivize the verification 
of transactions that allows them to be added to the blockchain, the network (of its own 
volition, as part of its algorithms) releases a set number of bitcoins to those who donate 
their CPU processing power towards verifying transactions (4). With encrypted 
identification as a standard, and the public blockchain as a verification schema, the 
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protocol, through wallet exchanges, allows the transfer of bitcoins from any wallet to any 
wallet, so long as they are connected to the network. 
Trust, rather than being placed in an institution, is operationalized in the protocol. 
Therefore, the Bitcoin protocol must find a way to articulate trust in the financial, 
political, and technological contexts that best express its ultimate goals. The benefits of 
identification, verification, and exchange find their antecedents in the Bitcoin protocol 
through the operations that it dictates, the standards that it implements, and the 
transactions that it then facilitates. Bitcoin users do not have to worry about fraud and 
double-spending because all transactions are public, and every wallet has an updated 
version of the ledger. Miners maintain the integrity of the system by performing complex 
encryption verification without a central agency to mediate that verification. Trading and 
mining are also decentralized: with the correct software (or hardware, in the case of 
mining), anyone can trade or mine, and any node can push an updated blockchain ledger 
so long as it adheres to the standards of the protocol. Since the points at which bitcoins 
can be traded are diverse, as are the hardware and software configurations used to mine 
bitcoins, and (in the case of mining) are often distributed across cloud-computing 
platforms, the ways in which Bitcoin allows for the movement of bitcoins extend across 
various registers of cultural and technological circulation.4 Since the release of bitcoins 
and the verification of transactions gathers the generative, shared agency of the nodes on 
the network for its own maintenance, the dispersal of ways to mine or trade bitcoins also 
                                                     
4 While independent mining hardware exists, and is deployed by hobbyists, the increasingly 
competitive field of bitcoin mining has led to the rising market of cloud mining, where a group of 
miners will work together, often purchasing or just building distributed cloud processing, to pool 
computational resources and, in theory, have an edge over smaller groups or individuals with less 
computing power.
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harnesses this distributed agency to perpetuate the network. As each node has “no chain 
of command,” there are “only autonomous agents who operated according to certain pre-
agreed 'scientific' rules of the system,” and as such each node shares the responsibility of 
maintaining the Bitcoin network (Galloway 38). The mechanisms that perpetuate this 
network are ultimately repeatable by any node in the network, so the circulation of 
bitcoins as a currency reflects the repeated, distributive movement of verification, 
mining, and trade. 
 
Since the Bitcoin protocol dictates the distribution of network maintenance across all its 
users (or in network parlance, “nodes”), it also distributes the responsibility of the 
network’s continued existence to those nodes, and as such defines the structure of those 
nodes (how they are embodied on the network, what sort of practices they engage in). 
Distribution as a network mechanism resembles other protocols, and illustrates how 
Bitcoin resembles other communication networks, and how protocols function as 
mechanism of control. 
Part of how Bitcoin articulates trust is how it incorporates the limits of TCP/IP. 
TCP/IP recognizably engages in a set of distributive practices similar to those of 
Bitcoin—the distribution of necessary actions to each participating node in the network 
for upkeep and network maintenance. TCP/IP’s existence (and, consequently, the 
existence of the Internet) demonstrates the strength of distribution, because its logic of 
distribution keeps the network robust and open. However, TCP/IP’s continued self-
maintenance also works through another piece of logic, in that IP transmissions are non-
anonymous. The protocol dictates that IP packets contain data recording the sending and 
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receiving addresses so that packets get where they are going. All data packets pass 
through multiple routing computers to get to their destinations, and intercepting or 
rerouting packets of data based on their destination and origin has become increasingly 
common (Gavrichenkov 2015, 3) This is a huge problem for online cash, since the 
manipulation of data could result in the loss of thousands of dollars through direct theft of 
bitcoins. But even more importantly, Bitcoin, in articulating trust, also sought to 
mechanize privacy: trust did not necessarily mean a personal accountability to anyone but 
did mean that the logics of trust in place could exclude the need for unwanted exposure 
over insecure communication lines. So the Bitcoin protocol defines a network that plays 
loose with IP addresses by separating the necessary connection between an IP address 
and the user of a wallet. Bitcoin users can connect their wallet to the Internet at any 
location. While the wallet and its use will be broadcast from that IP address, the 
connection between the user's identity, the address, and the wallet address remain 
separate. Alongside technologies such as a Virtual Private Network, Bitcoin offers a 
feasible (if not necessarily complete) privacy solution. With the proper encryption in 
place, not only are transactions private, but the identifying link between a node’s location 
on the Internet and a wallet address is broken. Furthermore, Bitcoin leverages the non-
anonymous aspects of TCP/IP through the blockchain. Since all transactions are public, 
all nodes are visible and all expenditures are traceable. But without a direct link between 
the node and its location, this extreme publicity becomes irrelevant: its institutes trust and 
privacy in one fell swoop. Thus, not only is Bitcoin like a cash for digital purchasing, it 
maintains the privacy of cash and the trust system of a governmental currency. 
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A common term that gets used quite often in this conversation is “distribution,” 
one that I believe centralized the political, communicative, and ultimately gendered 
question of agency and rhetoric in Bitcoin. Distribution not only serves as a productive 
fulcrum for thinking about how rhetoric and writing work in complex rhetorical 
situations, it also introduces an important facet of protocological order—control—another 
important concept for understanding how digital networks of circulation operate. We can 
think of circulation as a distributed affair of rhetorical production across a variety of 
networked sites. Distribution, in rhetoric, has typically referred to the way a text is 
prepared or delivered and circulated in and for a network of readers or audiences. The 
definition of distribution has changed, however, to address the complexity of writing 
publics and technologies, and often refers to the distribution of a writing process or 
rhetorical encounter across a variety of times, locations, and media. Jenny Rice (2007) 
writes that the shift from static models of rhetoric to complex ecologies opens up our 
attunement to writing as a “vocabulary of distribution’” that speaks to how writing 
practices are distributed across a material-social field of action (13). Rice’s focus on 
distribution points to how the “site” of rhetoric is less a discrete place and more a series 
of dynamic events and shifting, fluid locales of rhetorical interaction and production (10). 
Such a notion of distribution seems to share some affinities with James Porter’s (2009) 
attempt to inscribe distribution within a framework of digital delivery. Porter describes 
his idea of distribution as the production of texts and the choices of authors geared 
towards the idea of affecting the circulation of those texts. For Porter, distribution is 
closely related to circulation in digital technology because distribution, defined as 
“rhetorical decisions made about the mode of presenting discourse in online situations,” 
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implies thinking rhetorically about future circulatory possibilities at the point of 
production (214). For Porter, circulation is also the movement of rhetoric, or the 
circulatory force, that can be understood as a continual process of redistribution. 
Circulation, he argues, refers to the “potential for [a] message to have a document life of 
its own and be re-distributed without your direct intervention” (214). The document life 
of a message (in this example), he wants us to understand, is made possible by its 
redistribution across different rhetorical agencies, which implicates those agencies and 
their ability to redistribute that message. 
Because circulation implicates a distribution of action across different points in 
space and time and across different acting agencies, it invites us to think about a model of 
distributed agency. Borrowing from Bruno Latour, many rhetoricians have used his 
concept of distributed agency as a key aspect of their theoretical work. For Latour (1999), 
there are never individual acts, only the distribution of action across different acting 
agents. There is also, therefore, no single locus of agency, nor a pre-defined definition of 
agency, but only networks of distributed agency and transformation (306). Distribution 
opens up, then, not only the question of how, and by what means, rhetoric circulates 
(which is in large part the reason many theorists are inspired by the idea in the first 
place), but also introduces the method of “tracing” the relationships of circulating 
actors—what Jeff Rice (2008) describes, during his Google Maps-inspired travels 
through Detroit, as the “figuring out of agency and relation in a given situation” (28). 
Laurie Gries (2013), for example, in following the Obama Hope image produced 
during the 2008 presidential campaign, developed a method called “iconographic 
tracking,” which is indebted to Latour’s call to “reassemble the social” through the study 
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of distributed rhetorical agency and circulation (2005, 333). Suggesting a network 
approach to the study of how the Obama Hope images circulates, she writes that 
 
once produced and distributed in a networked pathway, images rapidly 
undergo change in terms of location, form, media, genre, and function. In 
addition, as rhetoric emerges from an image's encounters with human and 
other entities, images are often catapulted back into flow in divergent 
directions and generate even more configurations. (335) 
 
The difficulty, argues Gries, of studying something like an image as it circulates is that 
we are rhetorically trained to view it as a discrete object, a remnant of a heritage of 
representational assumptions of the stability of meaning. Gries would rather have us 
recognize that tracing an image is less the tracking of a moving object and more the 
tracing of transformations and rhetorical processes across redistribution points. 
 
The communicative labor of a network like Bitcoin lies directly in the distribution of 
communication roles, and not the other way around. It is the logic of the protocol that 
defines and articulates those boundaries and activities, then framing a technological 
context for the circulation of value. Bitcoin’s value is represented in bitcoin nominally, 
but more expansively the value of trust of circulated as a political phenomenon: it is not 
just a currency, but a form of freedom born from a distributed form of control. The 
protocol articulates bitcoins, articulates miners, but also articulates a political efficacy 
grounded in individual pursuit of wealth, constrained participation, and the value of our 
faith in the infallibility of digital technology and mathematics. 
 
The Politics and Rhetoric of Bitcoin 
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The politics of Bitcoin then will focus on a relationship between the logics of the politics 
at play in the development and use of Bitcoin. These are co-constitutive, and reside at a 
fault line between rhetoric as a political action and rhetoric as a technological analytic. 
Bitcoin’s politics, much like BitTorrent’s, are an ironic reconfiguration of trust that 
mobilizes certain values through the exchange of mediating institution for a mediating 
structure and algorithm. In the first, institutions, ostensibly filled by clerks, bankers, etc., 
are an essential part of interaction. In the latter, the middle ‘man’ is literally removed, and 
the burden of legitimacy placed on a seemingly normalized and transparent method of 
exchange. This is not to say that the human has been replaced by the machine: large 
banks as a matter of course incorporate complex software that ensures safe transactions 
and raises warnings when illegal spending or identity theft seems to have occurred. What 
it does say is that the politics of trust are extensible through different technologies. Trust 
as a value is not an intact entity that persists over time and space, but it is instead a value 
of the system, articulated by the system, and finally finding itself as a performative aspect 
of a larger network of users that it structures. 
     What does it mean to say that Bitcoin articulates a politics of trust? Answering 
this question involves tracing numerous aspects of the technology and its effects. The 
most immediate is the politics of privacy and individuality that are present in the Bitcoin 
white paper published by Nakamoto. First and foremost, Bitcoin is a critique of federal 
banking systems and regulation. This critique is leveraged through a digital medium 
precisely because that is the platform where trust has been in its most intractable state. 
Online transactions necessitate regulation and the middle-man logic of trust because of 
the inherent anonymity of the Internet. I cannot trust cash-like currency in digital 
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platforms because there is no way to completely ascertain who is trading, and there is no 
way to verify the exchange of a physical commodity through a digital medium without 
some sort of mediation. In Chapter 3 I spoke of the TCP/IP protocol. One of the 
interesting facts about TCP/IP is that the required and distributed routing action that 
occurs as part of network formation also requires the general knowledge of IP addresses 
across the network. That is, when I pull data from a server I must know its address, and it 
by default knows mine. But every computer that aids in the routing of packets across the 
network also knows them as well, and as such if my IP address requests data from 
another server, there is a routing record of my activity. TCP/IP is inherently non-
anonymous, and while there are Virtual Private Network (VPN) and encryption packages 
that attempt to counteract this, the truth of the matter is that they are incomplete solutions 
built on top of the already-existing limitations of the protocol. 
Anything built on or using TCP/IP must contend with this issue, especially if it 
offers any sort of security. To do so, Bitcoin disconnects a single aspect of TCP/IP (the IP 
address) from a necessary aspect of Bitcoin (the Bitcoin wallet address) by making the 
ledger public. If there is no connection between my wallet address and any given IP 
address that I might use (at an Internet café, through the TOR network), then the potential 
for secure action increases. But security is inherently limited, and so the important 
articulation of the technology is not security but trust in the security system. The trust 
comes not from the verification of my identity, but the validation of the exchange through 
the swarm of miners in the network. This “distribution” of the responsibility of network 
functionality on the surface mimics the distribution of routing responsibility in TCP/IP. 
However, Bitcoin subverts TCP/IP by leveraging swarms to solve its problem of trust. 
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There is no longer a need for institutional support when the entire network is the 
institution, but the institution of Bitcoin distributes trust as a rote operation of brute-force 
problem solving. The institutional role of Bitcoin the protocol melts into the background 
of a distributed network as the value of trust is grounded in a mediation and redefinition 
of agency and a shifting definition of communicative force as a legitimate exchange of 
value (value which is also constructed and circulated through the network via repetitive 
and self-constructing distributed action). The circulations of bitcoins are quanta not of 
economic value, but of exchanges of trust and communications of share agency. 
Bitcoin not only critiques regulated banking, but mobilizes the critical BitTorrent 
model to address limitations of the underlying technological structure at the same time. 
Bitcoin uses trust to then critique the model of trust in TCP/IP, transform is, and mobilize 
it in a different political technology. Ronald Walter Greene (2004) writes that so long as 
“rhetorical agency as communication is harnessed to a communicative model of 
interaction, rhetorical studies are destined to lodge a permanent anxiety over the quantity 
and quality of rhetorical agency needed to change the structures of power at the center of 
its intellectual labor” (203). The constant “rescaling and reframing” needed to sustain this 
engagement between individuals and political institutions leads to rhetoricians becoming 
“moral entrepreneurs” for right action, defining effective moral behaviors for 
communicative action (203). Greene and Nelson (2014) argue that digital rhetoric serves 
as a reinvention of the concept of communicative labor, in that it is not only the strategies 
and models of communication that produce value, but the labor of communication itself 
and the harnessing of value therein. 
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Gender Politics and Queer Performance 
The distribution of a political agency seems to place an intense locus of control on agents 
within the system, one that determines actions and actionable space (or lack thereof) in 
the use of the technology. Distribution is the engine of circulation, quite literally in this 
case—the distribution of nodes defined by Bitcoin enables the circulation of bitcoins. But 
even beyond this, the definition of distribution as an action illustrates how circulation 
functions as a rhetorical practice, and furthermore how the technologies of circulation are 
more than mere tools (and, perhaps, more than extensions of people using them). But 
beyond this, I argue that the control begets subversion as two necessary sides of the same 
coin (pun intended). The mere existence of Bitcoin as a multimodal critique of 
technology and privacy as well as a financial banking system attests to this, and through 
the performative chain of technological structure, with one technology emerging and 
reifying its predecessor and articulating its future potentiality, technopolitics emerge. 
     In Chapter 2, I quoted Zach Blas who described his work as a 
“disidentification” from capitalist technology. This term was created and mobilized by 
Jose Esteban Munoz (1994) as a description of subversive performance. Disidentification 
is not a rejection of normative identification, nor an acceptance, but a “rewiring” of the 
logics that maintain those identification as necessary or normal is society (9). For Munoz 
this was all about performance; citing performance art and artists working in queer and 
drag cultures, he highlighted how the performance of gender and sexuality was at the 
heart of disidentifying with dominant heteronormative culture. More concretely, it is the 
process of the “decoding of any mass, high, or other cultural field from the perspective of 
a minority subject who is disempowered in such a representational hierarchy” (26). The 
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disidentification that Blas mobilizes is the ideation of a sexual or gendered minority of 
technology, or specifically within the labor required to build it. The technique of 
abstraction was not only an effective programming technique, but an historically 
gendered one that marginalized women almost completely out of the field of 
programming. But disidentification also provides the platform to talk about what agency 
looks like within these protocological spaces precisely because in “rewiring” the logics of 
a dominant culture, the agent must practice some of the logics in new ways, and therefore 
must also indebted him or herself to those logics in a way that promotes their use. That is, 
the potential for disidentification, and rhetorical or political action, is rooted in adopting 
and subverting distributive logic. 
In the case of Bitcoin the performance of the minority seemingly begins with the 
adoption of a seemingly apolitical and gender-neutral majoritarian position. Brett Scott 
argues that one of the biggest myths tied to the Bitcoin development community is that 
the technology itself is simply a platform in which all autonomous and self-sufficient 
individuals are allowed to participate—but that participation requires effort, labor, and 
commitment (Scott). David Golumbia (2015) argues that Bitcoin is itself buoyed on a sea 
of “cryptopolitical” thinking that supports ideologies of self-determinism, radical 
isolationism, and a vague and abstract notion of “freedom” that endears it to a right-wing 
libertarian politic (123). The issue with these politics is that they, in their manifestation in 
technologies like Bitcoin, emanate from an historically white, male class of technological 
producers that emerged from the convergence of digital programming and academic 
achievement post war. What is “normal” in these communities is this whiteness and a 
kind of masculinity tied to libertarian politics tied to notions of meritocracy and 
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achievement. Golumbia notes that it is the volatility of the currency, tied directly to its 
libertarian underpinnings, which limits it to a very privileged and wealthy class of 
investors (124). The tool itself is a product and production of privilege, and more 
specifically privilege associated with a white heteronormative business culture that values 
self-determination and freedom. But self-determination is a two-edged sword, and is 
often the mode in which oppression is practiced. In a point-counterpoint editorial framed 
around the question of “is libertarianism a boon for LGBTQ individuals?” Julie Novak 
and Simon Copeland (2014) discuss the personal and structural aspects of LGBTQ 
oppression in society, and the compatibility of that oppression with classical libertarian 
ideals. Copeland specifically points out that the notion of “individual” freedom does not 
necessarily equate to personal freedom to act, writing that “much of this structural 
oppression is imposed by the state” (Novak and Copeland). Furthermore, the notion of a 
free market as one that liberates individual agents to act is at odds with the notion of 
individual liberties, particularly in instances where institutions or business make 
decisions that disenfranchise individuals in that market. Bitcoin is at its core an 
algorithmic representation of a sort of freedom of exchange, free from regulation outside 
of a group of peers. At the same time, it is also a marginalization of that freedom to act 
through the work of that peer group. Furthermore, the definitional nature of protocol in 
defining the nature of that peer group further restrains and controls the potentials for 
marginalization in that group. 
Freedom to act in this sense does not mean the guaranteed freedom of agency. 
Erin Rand (2014) argues that agency, and rhetorical agency, is best framed in a way that 
understands “agency as emerging from a set of determining forces external to the self,” 
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and that “it is the formal features of text . . . that enable rhetorical agency” (20). Rejecting 
the notion of a deterministic understanding of agency, Rand argues that agency and 
invention emerge from social relationships of power and the formal elements of texts that 
are bound up within those power relationships. This is where political action—and in her 
argument, queer political action specifically—both recognizes and pushes against 
traditional notions of agency that rely on the moralizing idealism that Greene critiqued. 
Therefore, Rand argues that “rhetorical agency resides neither in the rhetor nor in the text 
but arises from the positioning of discourse in terms of its formal features” (21). This is 
important for political activism, and LGBTQ activism, in that the field of political 
mobilization and resistance is not always tied to the moralistic entrepreneurship Greene 
critiqued, but instead finds outlet and recourse through the modality of expression and the 
forms that utterances can take. To say that Bitcoin is a critique is to say that, on the one 
hand, it is an enactment of this kind of understanding of agency, a realization of political 
possibility (or lack thereof) in form and structure. 
     On the other, it is to recognize the critical work of queer and feminist rhetoric in 
disentangling digital media from the discourse of neutral tool-use. Jacquie Rhodes and 
Jonathan Alexander write that “queer rhetoric names a constellation of discursive 
practices that emerge at different times for different groups in order to articulate 
resistance to regimes of sexualized normalization,” which in part calls into question the 
focus on gender and practice in my work. However, it is precisely the normalization of 
heteronormative practice as a technological practice that then articulates gender disparity 
in technological work. This is because protocol is a rhetorical form, as demonstrated, that 
has a single purpose of defining modalities of agency. The gendered politics of Bitcoin 
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thus come into relief through the question of agency, and its grounding in libertarian 
politics. Novak argues that the strength of libertarian politics is the freedom to break the 
mold of subjectivity in society and thus present a new form of resistance. However, as 
numerous queer theorists have pointed out, “breaking the mold” usually limits political 
action to a single actor and his or her relationship to an oppressive force within a direct 
situation. Copeland writes that “the growth of the modern nuclear family . . . was formed 
under capitalism, and is certainly queerphobic” (Novak and Copeland). By pointing to 
marriage as a structural limitation of agency for LGBTQ subjects, Copeland corresponds 
with Rand’s assertion that the form of relationships is such that agency is directly 
informed by, shaped by, and controlled by the formal discursive structures in which we 
relate. Marriage, as an example, can play out as a movement for civil rights, but it can 
also establish and reiterate conservative notions of familial units. Likewise, a political 
structure like Bitcoin that seemingly opens up a plane of action outside of regulation 
simply succumbs to a different sort of regulation, not of governments but of majorities. 
The gendered politics of Bitcoin are such then that they describe an imaginary space of 
action free from gendered politics, even as the ideological groundwork of the protocol 
and the politics (libertarianism) faces increasing inquiry into its lack of diversity. 
The protocol of a given network system is itself a definition of agency, and it 
articulates the boundaries within which effective action can occur. Rand writes that her 
definition of queer “works against the prevailing academic and popular trends to employ 
‘queer’ . . . as an umbrella term for ‘gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender’ identities . . . 
This is a de-essentialized notion of queerness that disconnects ‘queer’ from any particular 
referent and refigures it as the undecidability from which rhetorical agency is articulated” 
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(22). She also argues that this move still grounds political activism with a focus on 
sexuality and politics without being beholden to representations of sexuality. In terms of 
computational activism, this allows for a discussion of computational artifacts like 
protocols as both political and, if not explicitly sexualized, then implicitly gendered. But 
it also allows for a discussion of them as rhetorical objects that are not situated in 
political modes of rhetoric critiqued by Greene. That is, rhetoric is not, as Cheryl Geisler 
(2004) argues, bound to civic and educational models of persuasion to maintain 
relevancy, but instead an elaboration of agency as it is articulated by rhetorical media. 
 
Conclusion 
This leaves us with Bitcoin, not as an abstract protocol or system of software, but as a 
rhetorical framework that includes (but expands beyond) the context of textual 
interpretation and invites questions of rhetorical and political action. Its greatest political 
statement, very much a parallel to languages of efficiency and correctness in 
computational cultures, is its ironic assurance of its  non-political enactment. On the 
surface this seems illogical: how does a technology with an explicit political agenda 
function as a non-political technology? Because the rhetorics and agencies that emerge 
from a persuasive object of discourse like the Bitcoin protocol are not divorced from their 
historical and cultural context. Bitcoin is a conservative political project that carries with 
it a baggage that it articulates through its use and its users. It functions within a political 
context, but it also constructs that political context by legitimizing certain forms of labor 
and communication. The lack of women’s perspectives in the community can be traced to 
the community that surrounds it. Such a tracing brackets the technology outside of such 
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conversations and, ironically, allows for the apolitical myth of the technology to 
proliferate even as it articulates political agents. The drawing of boundaries around 
Bitcoin as a technology is part of its articulation of itself. It isn’t simply a question of 
acknowledging that technology is cultural, but better understanding how technology 
functions culturally. 
A key question here is “what does it mean to call Bitcoin a conservative 
technology?” We can begin to unmask some of the normative assumptions of the 
technology first and foremost in our understanding of it as a tool. Language and rhetoric 
can and are framed as tools of expression quite effectively in specific contexts, but when 
attempting to map this into all contexts we lose sight of what it means to define rhetoric 
as a relational practice. When we think of a tool we think of externality, of intention-
driven work in which the ideological or cultural aspects come from a joint application of 
intention and tool, of will and means. But with Bitcoin, or perhaps most protocols, the 
tool is itself a vast cultural network of ideological assumptions. Bitcoin in particular 
highlights what Galloway argues is one of the central aspects of protocols: that they 
function best when they hide their own inner workings. Abstraction, articulation, are all 
methods of hiding that require a sort of hiding of the underlying mechanisms that enable 
and constrain communication. 
The question of gender and resistance here necessarily extends beyond 
representation, because critiquing representation in a field such as cryptocurrency and 
Bitcoin allows for the myth of apolitical labor and technology to persist. Connell and 
Messerschmidt (2005) describe how, in certain forms of social relations and workplaces, 
certain forms of masculinity circulate and fall into stabilizing patters that they call 
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“hegemonic masculinity” (831). This is not a concrete definition of the masculine subject, 
but instead an analytic of how masculinity is constructed and solidified through particular 
social practices, while still allowing for different kinds of gender and sexual expression. 
Hegemonic masculinity is clear in a community like the Bitcoin community, because 
while there are generally alternative forms of masculinity on display, they fall into stable 
patterns that rest on notions of self-determination, resistance to social accountability, and 
a lack of concern for (or outright hostility towards) not equality, but equitable conditions 
that would inform equality in a productive fashion. It inherits this from BitTorrent 
because BitTorrent is a technology that articulates an exchange of responsibility and 
accountability, a transformation of values from one space to another. Thus when Winter 
Trabex writes a critique against a Facebook post discussing a “trans-inclusive bank” (or a 
bank that outwardly and rhetorically includes a group marginalized by sexuality and 
gender identity), she does so through a lens of neutral capitalism. So when she writes that 
“bitcoin is the [most] inclusive, pro-equality currency that has ever existed”, they do so 
unapologetically through the lens of neutral currency (Trabex). This is because Bitcoin 
“does not care if you are gay/Bitcoin does not care what country you are from/Bitcoin 
does not care if you have breasts and a penis, or if you are a man with a vagina” (Trabex). 
Truly, Bitcoin “does not care” if you have a penis or a vagina. Bitcoin may not advocate 
for a specific sexual norm or gender identity. But Bitcoin’s expression is far from 
apolitical, and its politics extend out in ways that go beyond strict representation. Bitcoin 
is not just a technology for conservative or capitalist use; it is itself a conservative and 
capitalist technology. 
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Chapter 5: 
Conclusion 
 
The imperative to think of digital technology as a form of rhetoric stems from the 
necessity to think of such media as inherently political and, in my analysis, gendered. 
Such an imperative shifts slightly from different theories that suggest that technology 
shapes already-existing discourse, or conforms to particular models stemming from 
spoken or written communication. In many ways, technology does just that. But it only 
does so when such theories view digital media through the lens of directed, persuasive 
language. If viewed as an expressive artifact that connects different forms of labor and 
collaboration, different forms of consumption, and multiple kinds of political 
performance, it manifests as a form of discourse in and of itself. And with such a 
manifestation the gendered (and, in many ways, the more generally ideological) 
implications become much more apparent. The claim that technology is political and 
gendered is therefore supported by such an analysis because it moves the burden of proof 
away from a strictly textual, or even strictly procedural analysis to incorporate a broader 
analysis that investigates technical documents like code and protocols as inherently 
rhetorical components of larger communication networks. I would also contend here that 
scholars looking to effectively analyze and utilize this kind of discourse must better 
understand the nuances of the given technologies at hand. Such an understanding, I argue, 
comes through some changes in scholarship and professional practices that I will discuss 
here. 
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In my argument, I have argued for the analysis of the expressive potential of computer 
code and protocols through their capacity as relational technologies. “Relational 
technologies” are technologies that are first and foremost technologies that structure 
communicative      relationships through their logic of operation. This at first glance 
seems self-evident. As Marshall McLuhan (1966) argued, “[a]ll media exist to invest our 
lives with artificial perceptions and arbitrary values,” suggesting that the foundational act 
of a medium is to produce “values” (199). While there are some implications in 
McLuhan’s work that significantly differ from some of my findings here, I do support the 
idea that technology creates and propagates values. Relational technologies construct 
relational values, certainly, but they do so because they circulate at a level of 
relationships. Styles of labor and communication beget logics of the same, which 
structure global networks, all of which perform and reiterate the value inherent in those 
styles. If a style of collaboration tends to favor characteristics that have been associated 
with particular genders, then we must recognize those styles as part of the discourse of 
code and protocol even if “gender” as a textual or linguistic construct is not present in a 
given technical document. Code and protocols are designed specifically to structure the 
potential for further communication, either through the shaping of coding language and 
syntax or through the shaping of labor and agency in communication networks. 
I focus on constructions of gender because they represent a major, though not 
exclusive, problem for technical communities. Gender highlights the horizon through 
which technical specialists can adhere to calls for correctness of efficiency—that is, the 
inherently apolitical in such communities. The notion that politics are a performative 
aspect of computer code and networks links gender performance and computational 
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techniques like abstraction as historical rather than (or not simply) mechanical. 
Grounding that claim in the labor and vocabulary of software engineering and computer 
science further supports claims by scholars of feminist technoscience (Wajcman 1991; 
Barad 2007; 2007), cyberfeminism (Haraway 1991; Daniels 2009; Wajcman 2004), and 
queer computation studies (Blas 2008; Gaboury 2013) who argue that technology is 
inherently gendered and political. In my analysis, I illustrate how abstraction and erasure 
in programming reflects techniques that are apparent in reading technical documents like 
code and protocol. I suggest that these techniques cannot be separated from the labor and 
collaboration that produce and utilize them, which in turn situates programming and 
technical documents in a larger history of performative gender. Likewise, queer activism 
in digital technology cited in my argument further demonstrates that this gendered and 
political aspect of technology reconnects the seemingly disconnected aspects of software 
development, namely contemporary programming culture and the products of that culture 
(such as software, protocol specification, etc.). Queer activism in digital media highlights 
the ways in which digital technology, gender, and even sexuality overlap as the politics of 
a given community. My argument expands on this to show how a particular form of 
masculinity is historically constructed within a technological continuum of use and 
production. The practices that structure such technology are rooted in very simple 
assumptions about how gender conforms with different kinds of work, which then 
impacts programming communities, global businesses, technical education. 
I believe that understanding the rhetorical capacity of technology in these terms 
presents great opportunities and challenges for scholars in multiple fields like rhetoric, 
120 
 
gender studies, and media studies. I generally break these challenges and opportunities 
into three general and interrelated categories: theory, teaching, and collaboration. 
    
Theory and Analysis 
If digital technology is political and gendered, then successful analysis will grapple with 
the terms of that technology in order to articulate how that works. In the “terms” of 
computer code and protocols, scholars cannot relegate a gendered practice only to textual 
or procedural representation without embedding that text or procedure within its 
historical and technical context. The myth of correctness or effectiveness in code rests in 
the fact that it is meant for processing by a machine, which implies that there is a 
knowable limit to how code can function culturally. The shift from one form of 
communication to the next will allow us to recognize how, say, rhetoric or gender studies 
informs analysis of technology. But conversely, the medium of expression dictates new 
terminologies outside these theories that will inform how we think about things like 
persuasion or gender. For example, discussing code through rhetorical terms offers 
insight into the persuasive nature of the language of code and of algorithms while, in 
many ways, reasserting objects like code as singular texts with recognizable authors, 
audiences, and intentions. As Katherine Hayles (2005) argued, code cannot function as 
performative language in the terms outlined by thinkers such as Jacques Derrida or J.L. 
Austin because of the limiting context of the machine (55). I counter that positing the 
machine as the premier limitation of code qua discourse (pun intended) is self-fulfilling 
because it maps the limitations of language onto code without augmenting its 
assumptions for that medium. Rhetorical or discursive approaches to code that already 
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presuppose the machine as an “audience” or arbiter conflate correctness with affect 
specifically because the mechanisms of computation are ultimately seen as outside 
cultural interpretation, rather than co-producers of it. Feminist and queer studies help 
reframe the question as one of labor and collaboration rather than of discourse so that a 
given piece of code can at least be acknowledged as only a small part of a potentially 
monstrous piece of software, which itself is embedded in a long history of code and 
programming. 
Theorizing code as gendered and open to rhetorical analysis will ultimately mean 
focusing on programming as writing, which in turn means actually grounding analysis in 
those practices. Programming is in fact a form of communicative labor, one with 
connections to traditional rhetorical frameworks. But it also represents a unique context 
of communication with different norms, goals, and participants. An algorithm is not an 
algorithm without the bedrock of knowledge, practices, and usages that give it its context. 
Rhetorical approaches to code highlight the impact of software on rhetoric while defining 
the scope of code as a form of communication. But by approaching code itself as 
performative, we can address how limiting this can be, particularly when attempting to 
specify how something like gender becomes part of technology rather than something 
alongside it. This is why the initial move of recognizing performativity (as outlined by 
Derrida), gender performativity, and computational abstraction as incredibly similar 
phenomenon in very different contexts is so important. Analysis and theorization will see 
procedure and text as markers that perform particular forms of labor, rather than strictly 
representational texts, which incorporates a larger and wider set of concerns for users, 
engineers, and even the machine. 
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Collaboration 
To do this kind of analytic work, scholars in rhetoric and gender studies will necessarily 
begin to collaborate more closely with scholars in fields like computer science. I imagine 
this move as analogous with the shift from lone programmers writing small scripts and 
utilities to large, industry-supporting or defining software. The scope of collaboration and 
labor needed between these two extreme ends reflects differences of kind rather than 
scale. As Fred Brooks (1975) acknowledged in the very earliest days of software 
development, “[w]hen a task cannot be partitioned because of sequential constraints, the 
application of more effort has no effect on schedule” because the application of more 
personnel hours is essentially counterproductive for non-sequential labor like software 
development (16, 20). Moving from one end (smaller development) to the other (larger 
development) is not simply a multiplication of responsibilities and workforce, but a 
fundamental shift in how people work together on a single project. In investigating 
algorithms or small pieces of code, I fear that we fall into the trap of mapping our own 
expectations on a process that doesn’t bear them out at larger scales. However, I also 
reject that as we move into larger scales of complexity that theory drops focus on the 
technology altogether, or roots analysis only in the social uptake of a technology. 
Thinking about larger-scale software production calls for an incorporation of the 
techniques and labor that emerge from such fields, which requires a much closer working 
relationship with experts in those fields. The above productivity-scale problem serves as 
a metaphor for the gap between how scholarship works in different disciplines. While 
humanities scholars have made great strides within the contemporary model of 
scholarship that favors individual or small-collaboration publication, it may come to pass 
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that more expansive investigations into code and other technical specifications will not 
remain feasible outside equally expansive approaches to collaboration and publication. 
This is the trap that I see myself fall into even as I write this: my approach as an 
outsider—as a humanities scholar considering the realm of digital technology through 
particular understandings of the political work of technology. I may have familiarity with 
the field, its terms, and its concepts, but it has been years since my undergraduate 
education in computer science, and years since I have done any serious coding. And, 
having never worked in the field, I have come to understand that this is much more of a 
limitation for my work than when I started. To condemn a toxic, misogynistic worldview 
is necessary, but the next necessary step is to engage through shared values and new, 
interdisciplinary approaches to scholarship. If styles of collaboration reflect historical 
constructions of gender in the technical fields that I have discussed, then we can also 
model and perform different styles of scholarly collaboration that reflect different sets of 
values, different political assumptions. One might argue that these steps have already 
been taken in areas like digital humanities. As Adam Kirsch writes, however, there has 
been focus on the building of tools and methods as an expansion of the field that 
simultaneously marginalizes other portions of that same field (Kirsch). In omitting the 
focus on building tools or serving as clients for computer scientists to build software, I 
believe that critical scholars of rhetoric and gender can address the essential questions 
gender, technology, and labor raised by my argument. 
I believe that the performative nature of technology necessitates significant 
interdisciplinary relationships between scholars in the humanities and in STEM fields. I 
use the word “necessitates” because, beyond questions of expertise and experience, it is 
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imperative that the critical questions prevalent in both fields become common points of 
inquiry for future scholarship. My focus on gender presents a point for such inquiry. As 
the recognition of gender disparity and masculine “bro” culture become better understood 
as toxic and limiting, it becomes less apparent how technology itself serves as a point by 
which gender proliferates. Studies of rhetoric and gender cannot stand on the outside of 
computer science and engage in such important critiques without also involving experts 
in the field and in academia to provide insight into how that critique can serve as an agent 
of change. I am not calling for negotiation of some sort of professional turf, but an honest 
and, as far as I see, more substantial approach to the question of gender and technology as 
it is constructed in professional and academic contexts. We must have a goal, surely. We 
must critique and confront particular forms of dominating or hegemonic masculinity if 
and as they rise in these particular communities. But we must all enact a collaborative 
agenda that values such collaboration in and of itself. How we accomplish this is beyond 
the purview of this argument. 
 
Pedagogy 
The classroom is perhaps the most concrete space where technology, writing, rhetoric, 
and cultural questions of gender overlap. Digital media and connectivity, not to mention 
multimodal composition and writing studies, have become a staple of pedagogical theory 
and practice. Rather than reiterate scholarship relating to such a claim, it suffices to say 
that one of the major questions in writing pedagogy is how digital technology fits into the 
classroom, more specifically how the emerging body of scholarship on rhetorical code 
studies fits into these classrooms. 
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Consider Slash Goggles as an exercise. It already presents us with an explicit 
lesson in how technology can overlap with questions of computation. The lessons that it 
would provide for approaches, such as procedural rhetoric, are apparent, as are its 
implications for critical theories of gender. It could also serve as a general introduction 
into such theories in a course oriented towards digital media and gender, as it asks any 
number of questions that students could dig into and expand on over the course of an 
entire term. With a little preparatory work, teachers in gender studies, rhetoric, or 
composition/writing studies could find any number of approaches to the text. But what 
about actual programming classes? There are some debates about the role of computer 
code in the writing classroom, but what of actual courses that teach actual, production-
oriented coding through large frameworks or on fluid, online platforms? If scholars in the 
humanities are to take seriously the fact that technology itself is expressive and political, 
it does not stand to reason that using that technology to teach tradition rhetorical models 
of communication (as one example) will present equal opportunity to explore the political 
implications of that technology without spending time investigating the mechanisms of 
that technology. Such a task would require a more technical vocabulary and background 
than typically presented in such cases. 
I suggest two complementary approaches. The first is a better understanding of 
collaborative teaching across STEM and humanities disciplines in STEM classrooms that 
foreground critical and cultural topics like gender as integral to technical fields. Rather 
than suggesting a generic co-teaching situation, I offer that the integral work of critical 
gender and rhetorical studies would be to create initiatives geared towards supporting 
truly interdisciplinary pedagogies geared towards shaping programmatic curriculum and 
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requirements from the ground up. Rather than efforts to integrate marginal courses that 
address issues of discourse and gender into existing curriculum in computer science, I 
argue for critical computational pedagogies focused on addressing the histories and 
politics of computer programming that are actually grounded in those fields. These kinds 
of pedagogies could produce engaging and productive coursework in the Humanities and 
in STEM fields like computer programming so long as they are informed by scholarship 
and research from both sides. They would also raise significant, shared values between 
the two disciplines and open up space for conversation and debate that is not argued from 
across different disciplinary concerns. 
For such a curriculum to take shape, my two previous points must come into play. 
Without serious efforts into collaborative and interdisciplinary research that promotes 
collaborative, interdisciplinary scholarship, I do not believe that such a pedagogy will 
present itself. I believe this to be the case because few, if any, rhetorical scholars 
understand the fundamentals of computer science to such a degree that they could 
feasibly teach, for example, a critical examination of programming techniques for young 
professionals preparing to enter the field. This is not a slight against such scholars, 
because that is not the discipline they study. We wouldn’t realistically expect a computer 
scientist to effectively teach surveys in literature or prepare young graduates to instruct 
writing courses either. As exemplified in my argument, there are interesting crossroads 
where critical theories of language and gender intersect with computational culture. It 
would only increase the potential for real work with significant impact when we start to 
work together to produce a shared discourse with common goals. 
I believe that many of these concerns carry an element of formality that places questions 
of gender in technology in the background. The fact remains that, in many technical jobs that 
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involve programming or engineering, women are the vast minority. This fact is itself a problem, 
but also, I believe, a symptom of the distressing history of gender and digital technology. The 
representational problem, I contend, is a symptom of (at least in part) structural problems that 
span styles of collaboration and education. When I slide into talk of collaboration and teaching 
and rhetoric, what I seek to do is foreground the structural issues that I see unfold in my analysis 
that are not clear, and often go unnoticed. In calling for more integrated forms of scholarly 
collaboration and teaching, I am hoping for a form of scholarship to emerge that sees computation 
and computer programming as critical and cultural areas of study, and that fully calls upon and 
integrates the knowledge of that field. In writing this dissertation I am convinced that the 
limitation I faced here, one that will shape my future work, are that I approached it as a solitary 
author. This is writ large across multiple fields, and I hope that the arguments staged here will 
inform future work that emphasizes such collaboration as an end goal that creates the conditions 
of change       
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